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INTRODUCTION

[T]he putting of Gab~ikovo into operation not only secures the
fulfillment of the aims of the investment, to the advantage of
both sides, but the side effects will have prevailing positive influence on the environment of both Czecho-Slovak and Hungarian
territories. 1
In the common reach of the Danube between Hungary and
Slovakia the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic is preparing to
divert the river into a new riverbed. According to the project in
the length of 40 kilometers they are to divert the Danube without
regard to the unpredictable ecological damages, to the new political tensions thus generated in the region,
and to the vehement
2
protests of the concerned population.
The construction of the Gab~ikovo-Nagymaros Project (G-N Project or Project) on the Danube River has given .rise to one of the
most controversial bilateral environmental disputes in Europe. The
G-N Project generates controversy on some of the most sensitive
and emotional issues of our time: environmental degradation, protection of the rights of an ethnic minority, jeopardization of economic subsistence, inviolability, of international borders,
development of sustainable energy resources, and the lingering
power of the communist apparatus in Eastern Europe.
As the dispute over the G-N Project festers, both Slovakia and
Hungary continue to amass information and produce a substantial
literature regarding the environmental consequences of the Project. While Hungary has striven to convince its "domestic constituency and the international community that the Project will result in
substantial environmental degradation of the Danube River region,
Slovakia has attempted to refute or minimize Hungary's allegations
of environmental danger. The process of amassing environmental
information has successfully galvanized domestic opinion and attracted the attention of the international community, but has done
1. Miroslav B. Lika, The Gabltovo-NagymarosProject - Its.Real Signficance and Impacts, 6 EuROPA VINcET 7 (Nov. 1992) [hereinafter Significance and Impacts of G-NProject] (public relations
magazine published by the government of Czechoslovakia; copy on file with the Columbia
Journal of Environmental Law).
2. GABUKovo-NAGYmARos FiL, THE PIUME MINISTER'S OFFICE, SECRETAIUAT OF MR-FERENC
MADL, MINISTER wrrHou-r PoRTFOLio (Oct. 1992) [hereinafter G-N FLE] (pamphlet; copy on
file with the ColumbiaJournalof EnvironmentalLaw). "For us, [the GaUkovo] power station is
a manifestation of voluntarist gigantomania and disdain for public opinion and science. In
Slovakia, however, this power station stands for new national independence, national pride
and Slovak strength, will, decisiveness and creativity." Janos Martonyi, State Secretary in the
Hungarian Foreign Ministry, quoted from Judith Ingram, Slovaks PushingDanube Project, N.Y.
TrmEs, Oct. 25, 1992, § 1 at 13.
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little to resolve the dispute itself. Although Hungary and Slovakia
successfully argue the "environmental facts" of the dispute, neither
party substantially articulates the legal justifications for its position.
The resolution of the G-N Project dispute requires international law
to identify the legal rights and obligations of Hungary and Slovakia.
Once identified, the competing rights and obligations of Slovakia
and Hungary must be subject to the crucible of legal analysis in
order to focus and narrow the issues. Only by narrowing the contested issues may the parties begin to negotiate a resolution of their
dispute.
This article attempts to promote a resolution of the G-N Project
dispute by examining the potential legal arguments of Slovakia and
Hungary. The article does not argue a particular position, but
rather weighs the persuasiveness of the various arguments that
might reasonably be made by either of the parties. The offered
legal analysis aims to answer the following questions: (1) What legal
questions are central to the resolution of the dispute? (2) Does
either party have a solid legal basis for its position in the dispute?
and (3) What use may be made of the substantial environmental
evidence collected by the parties?
The three principal legal issues that arise from the G-N dispute
and that will be discussed in this article are: (1) Whether the 1977
Agreement between Czechoslovakia and Hungary providing for the
construction of the G-N Project continues in force; (2) Whether,
given the Hungarian renunciation of the 1977 Agreement, Slovakia
may unilaterally pursue a Provisional Solution consisting of the construction of the Gabaikovo portion of the Project on its territory;
and (3) What claims for damages will arise if the Provisional Solution is allowed to continue operation (or, alternatively, if
enjoined).3
Because Hungary and Slovakia have recently agreed to submit
the dispute to the International Court ofJustice (I.C.J.), particular
emphasis will be placed on the I.CJ.'s treatment of the legal issues
discussed in this article. 4 As preliminary background to this legal
analysis, the article will outline the facts of the G-N Project dispute.
The summarization includes: a description of the geography of the
3. In order to present a useful legal analysis of the dispute, international legal principles
should not be examined independently of other factors that affect the dispute. This article
will, therefore, attempt to incorporate consideration of the socio-political aspects of the 3-N
dispute.
4. Government to Accept Hague Court Decision on Dam, 2 April 1993 F.B.I.S. at 9.
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Danube River Basin and the plans for its alteration by the G-N Project, the expected Project benefits, a chronology of events leading
to the current G-N Project dispute, and the alleged environmental
consequences of the Project.
I.

GEOGRAPHIC CHARACTERISTICS OF THE DANUBE RIVER BASIN
AND

PLANS

FOR ITS ALTERATION

The Danube River flows 1,776 miles from Germany to the Black
Sea through the countries of Austria, Slovakia, Hungary, Serbia,
and Montenegro, forming the international border between Bulgaria and Romania. Prior to the collapse of the former Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (Soviet Union), the Danube River was a
critical passage for Soviet shipping and military interests. The Danube remains important as a transportation link between the
Ukraine and Russia, and Eastern Europe. It also grows increasingly
important for transit of goods between Eastern and Western Europe. The entire river is navigable year-round, except for three
months when it becomes intermittently impassible between Bratislava in Slovakia and Nagymaros in Hungary.
The 1920 Peace Treaty of Trianon (Treaty), conceived by the victorious powers of World War I, divided the Austro-Hungarian Empire (Empire) into the countries of Austria, Hungary, and
Czechoslovakia, ceding much of the former Empire to neighboring
countries.5 Desiring to provide the new state of Czechoslovakia composed of Bohemians, Moravians, Silesians, and Slovaks - with an
outlet to the Black Sea, 6 the Treaty dictated that a specific portion
of the border between Czechoslovakia and Hungary would be de7
marcated by "the principal channel of navigation of the Danube."
Ethnic Hungarians populated, almost exclusively, the swath of traditionally Hungarian territory provided to Czechoslovakia by this demarcation. 8 In order to deter secessionist tendencies, the
5. Peace Treaty of Trianon, Treaties, Conventions, InternationalActs, Protocols, and Agreements

between the United States of America and Other Powers, 1910-1923, at 3558 (1923) [hereinafter
Peace Treaty of Trianon]; D. G. KosARY & S. B. VARDY, HISTORY OF THE HUNGARIAN NATION
222 (1969). For an examination of the effects of the dismemberment of the Austro-Hungarian Empire on ethnic Hungarian populations, see I. Mocsv, THE EFFECTS OF WORLD WAR
I: THE UPROOTED (1983).

6. W. V. WALLACE, CZECHO-SLOVAKIA 128-35 (1976).
7. Peace Treaty of Trianon, supra note 5, art. 27, 1 4 at 3558.
8. For a discussion of the creation of Czechoslovakia and the circumstances of its ethnic
Hungarian population, see C.

WOJAT.sEK,

FROM TRIANON TO THE FIRST VIENNA ARBITRAL
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Government of Czechoslovakia resettled large numbers of Slovaks
into the area.
The 1947 Paris Peace Treaty following World War II reconfirmed
the border between Czechoslovakia and Hungary along the Danube
River. 9 Recognizing the ethnic tension between the Slovaks and
Hungarians in the Danube River region, Czechoslovakia and Hungary entered into a bilateral treaty on February 27, 1946, that provided for a one-to-one repatriation of ethnic Slovaks and
Hungarians. Over 750,000 Hungarians remained in Czechoslovakia
after the repatriation because there were substantially more Hungarians in Czechoslovakia than Slovaks in Hungary. I0
In the early 1950s the Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia developed an interest in improving navigability of the Danube River and
in increasing hydroelectric production on the river. The G-N Project was basically a plan to divert the Danube River from its natural
watercourse into a navigable artificial waterway located within the
borders of Czechoslovakia. Three dams would be constructed: one
located at the mouth of the canal, to divert the Danube into the
canal; one in the mid region of the canal, to regulate water level
and generate hydroelectric power; and one downstream of the canal, to return the water levels to run-of-the-river 1 and to generate
additional hydroelectric power.12 By 1963 Hungary had been enticed to join the plan. The governments of Hungary and Czechoslovakia then began to develop a joint investment programme and
construction plans for the Project.' 3
II.

PERCEIVED BENEFITS ARISING FROM CONSTRUCTION OF THE

GABUiKOVO-NAGYMAROS PROJECT

The G-N Project promised many benefits to Czechoslovakia,
Hungary, and other user states of the Danube River.' 4 Among the
AWARD: THE HUNGARIAN MINORrY IN THE FIRsT CZECHOSLOVAK REPUBLIC 1918-1938 (1980).

See also WALIACE, supra note 6, at 148-50.
9. Treaty of Peace with Hungary, 1947, T.I.A.S. 1651, art. 1, para 4(c) at 47-48.
10. K. JANICS, CZECHOsLovAK POLICY AND THE HUNGARIAN MlNorry 1945-1948, at 133-34
(1982).
11. "Run-of-the-river levels" refers to the levels at which the Danube River would flow but
for the operation of dams and other diversionary structures.
12. G-N FILE, supra note 2, at 1.
13. Id.
14. The preamble of the 1977 Agreement cites the mutual interest of Czechoslovakia and
Hungary in the development of "water resources, energy, transport, agriculture and other
sectors of the national economy" that will result from the G-N Project. Treaty Between the
Hungarian People's Republic and the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic Concerning the Con-
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benefits that were envisioned bilaterally, or for the common good,
are the following:
(1) The plan would provide needed electricity to its participants
at relatively low environmental cost. Both the Hungarian and
Czechoslovakian economies depend heavily on high-energy-consumption heavy industries. Coal-fired power plants currently meet
much of the energy needs of these industries. The hydroelectric
projects along the Danube would, however, provide an alternative,
renewable, domestic source of electric energy. The Gab~ikovo
plant would have an installed capacity of 720 megawatts and an annual production of 3.0 billion kilowatt-hours. 15 The Nagymaros
plant would have a capacity of 158 megawatts and an annual production of 1.0 billion kilowatt-hours.' 6 This clean hydroelectric energy would improve the regional environment by reducing
7
industrial dependence on coal-generated electricity.1
(2) The G-N Project would provide necessary flood protection for
the Danube plain. Two hundred square kilometers of the Danube

struction and Operation of the Galbikovo-Nagymaros System of Locks, Sept. 16, 1977, 1109
U.N.T.S. 236 [hereinafter 1977 Agreement]. The preamble also notes that the Project "will
further strengthen the fraternal relations of the two States and significantly contribute to
bringing about the socialist integration of the States members of the Council for Mutual
Economic Co-operation." Id
15. Vodohospodarska Vystavba, Bratislava, THE GABdKOvO-NAGYMAROS PRojEcr: PART
GABUIKovo, SOLUTION ACCORDING TO THE 1977 TEArv 2 (hereinafter PART GABUKovo] (pam-

phlet; copy on file with the ColumbiaJournal of Environmental Law). The power generated
from the Gabikovo plant would meet approximately 7% of Slovakia's electricity needs. Diverte, DanubeFades, and the Rage Rises, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 8, 1992, § 1 at 14.
16. PART GABtKOvO, supra note 15, at 2.
17. Miroslav B. Lika, HYDRoCoNsULT BRATIsLAvA, Gab ikovo-Nagymaros Project - Basic
Informations About Its Actual State and Perspectives 13 (June 1991) [hereinafter Basic Informations] (engineering report prepared for Vodohospodarska Vystavba Bratislava; copy on file
with the ColumbiaJournalof EnvironmentalLaw). It is estimated that the power generated by
the G-N Project would eliminate the need to burn 3.9 million tons of brown coal or 1.4
million tons of crude oil. GOVERNMENT OF SLOVA.iA, INFORMATION ABOUr THE SCOPE OF
WATERwORxs 2 (Feb. 25,
1992) [hereinafter INFORMAr1ON] (photo-duplicated memorandum, produced in Bratislava,
copy on file with the ColumbiaJournal ofEnvironmentalLaw). Combustion of 3.9 million tons
of coal would produce 23 thousand tons of sulphur-based fumes. Id. A second estimation
indicates that the G-N Project would eliminate the need to burn 5.5 million tons of brown
coal. The combustion of 5.5 million tons of brown coal would produce "1.6 million tons of
ashes, 42.5 thousand tons of flying ashes, 182.2 thousand tons of SO2, 14.7 thousand tons of
NOx, 102.5 tons of arsenium and 5.2 million tons of CO2," and consume an amount of oxygen equal to that produced by more than 400,00 hectares of forest. Basic Informations, supra
at 16-17.
PROBLEMS CONNEcTED WrrH THE SYSTEM OF GABaKOvo-NAGYMAROS
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plain were flooded in 1954.18 Approximately 1000 square kilometers of the plain were flooded in 1965, forcing the evacuation of
some 55,000 people.' 9 By damming the river in three different locations, the G-N Project would provide flood protection for the adjacent Danube plain, which lies below the high-water level of the
20
Danube River.
(3) The project would substantially enhance the navigability of
the Danube River. Sandbars, narrows, and fords downstream of
Bratislava prevent barge traffic from fully utilizing this area of the
Danube River. 21 The G-N Project would allow barges loaded to full
capacity to navigate this stretch of river throughout the year. 22 The
new reservoir and improved navigation would also improve the possibility that Bratislava could establish a major industrial port.23 Fi-

nally, the enhanced navigation was intended to improve the ability
of the Soviet Fleet to manoeuver within the waterways of Eastern
24
Europe and reduce the shipping costs of Soviet goods.
Secondary benefits believed to accrue from the G-N Project include: a supply of gravel and material dredged from the reservoir
sites; a supply of filtrated water from planned infiltration canals;
increased capacity of freshwater wells due to increased water levels
caused by the reservoir impoundment; the availability of reservoir
18. Basic Informations, supra note 17, at 13;

INFORMATIoN,

supra note 17, at 1. Slovakia

contends that the lack of economic development in the area is a result of the frequent flooding of the Danube Plain in the area of Gab.ikovo. Id.

19. Id.
20. Basic Informations, supra note 17, at 13.
21. Id.
22. Id. The time during which this channel may be navigated would decrease by 40%, and
the carrying capacity of barges would increase by at least 20%, the fuel consumption being
reduced by one half. Id. Slovakia contends that, if the Federal Republic of Germany completes the Rhine-Maine-Danube canal, the G-N Project will facilitate "opening to nations of
eastern Europe a short and economic way to the inland water-way system of western Europe."
Id at 14.
23. Judit Galambos, Political Aspects of an Environmental Conflict: The Case of the Gab&iwvoNagymaros Dam System, in PERSPECTIVES ON ENVIRONMENTAL CONFLICT AND INTERNATIONAL REIATIONS 79 (J. Kakonen, ed. 1992); THE DANUBE STOR. EDUCATIONAL SUMMARY 32 (commissioned by the Hungarian government, Budapest, Feb. 1991) [hereinafter DANUBE STORY].
24. The relocation of a river for the purpose of increasing navigability is consistent with
the "Transformation of Nature" approach traditionally taken by Soviet style governments.
Galambos, supra note 23, at 75; see also THE DANUBE DEFENSE ACTION COMMITTEE, THE DANUBE BLUES: QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS ABOUT THE BOS (GABttKOvO)-NAGYMARos HYDROELECTRIC STATION SysTEM 6 (Budapest, October 1992) [hereinafter THE DANUBE BLUES]. On the

psychological level, the construction of the G-N Project is a demonstration of the power of
the governing regime, akin to the construction of pyramids or skyscrapers. Galambos, supra
note 23, at 78.
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water surface for water-based recreation; increased fish stock, resulting in increased utilization for sport fishing; the general "enhancement of economic development of the region, amelioration of its
communication systems and civic infrastructure;"2 5 and the improved irrigation of agricultural lands located above the first dam. 26
III.

CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTs LEADING UP TO GABtiKOVONAGYMAROS

A.

DisPuTE

Czechoslovakia-HungaryBilateralAgreement of 1977

The Government of Czechoslovakia and the Government of Hungary entered into a bilateral Agreement in 1977 (1977 Agreement
or Agreement) for the construction and operation of the G-N Project.2 7 This agreement provided for the joint construction and op-

eration of the G-N Project, including relatively detailed plans for
the construction of three dams and the diversion of the Danube
River.2 8 Czechoslovakia and Hungary were to share equitably the
29
construction costs and the produced energy.
The Agreement provided that the G-N Project would be constructed between Danube River kilometers 1696 and 1862. The
first dam would be placed at Hrusov/Dunakiliti, flooding an area of
60 square kilometers ending in Bratislava and raising the water level
by 6.5 meters. The Dunakiliti Dam would route 95% of the Danube
River water from its natural course into a 17 kilometer canal that
parallels the old Danube River channel. The canal, located five kilometers within the borders of Czechoslovakia, would be 300-650
30
meters wide, 9-18 meters high, and lined with asphalt and plastic.
The Gab~ikovo hydroelectric dam would be located at the end of
the 17 kilometer canal, near the town of Gab~ikovo. This dam
would contain eight turbines capable of producing 720 megawatts
of energy. The Gab~ikovo Dam would release water at peak consumption hours in order to maximize efficient energy production.
After release from the Gab~ikovo Dam, the water would run
25. Basic Informations, supra note 17, at 14; Resolution of the National Council of the Slovak
Republic on the G-N Hydroelectric Project, (Mar. 24, 1993), reprinted in F.B.I.S. - Eastern Europe
15-16 (Mar. 30, 1993) [hereinafter Resolution of the National Council].
26. Galambos, supra note 23, at 78.
27. 1977 Agreement, supra note 14. The 1977 Agreement was signed on September 16,
1977, and came into force on June 30, 1978, upon exchange of the instruments of ratification. I at 236 and 248.
28. Id. at 236-37.
29. Id art. 5, at 239-40; Galambos, supra note 23, at 74.
30. 1977 Agreement, supra note 14, at 236-37; Galambos, supra note 23, at 73.
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through an eight kilometer canal back to the old Danube River
channel. Water traffic would be diverted from the old Danube
River channel into the 25 kilometers of canal.3 1
The Nagymaros hydroelectric dam would be constructed in Hungary, 100 kilometers downstream of where the river had been returned to its natural channel. The Nagymaros Dam would work
continuously to produce electricity (158 megawatts) 3 2 and to return
the water to run-of-the-river levels.3 3
B.

1986 Austria-Hungary ContractualAgreement for Construction of
the Nagymaros Dam

Construction of the Nagymaros Dam began in early 1978. But by
the early 1980s, increasing skepticism of Hungarian hydrologists
and biologists, coupled with the economic recession of the period,
led Hungary to suspend construction of its share of the Project and
4
initiate a study of its ecological consequences.3
Hungary began negotiations with Czechoslovakia in June 1981,
proposing that Czechoslovakia construct the Project. Hungary
would compensate Czechoslovakia for its half of the construction
cost through a returned electricity payment.3 5 Czechoslovakia refused responsibility for the completion of the Project, but it was
willing to assume some of the construction responsibilities and to
provide Hungary with a four-year delay with which to secure financing for construction of its remaining share of the Project.3 6 The
parties formalized this agreement in a Protocol to the 1977 Agree7
ment on October 10, 1983.3
31. 1977 Agreement, supra note 14, at 236-37; Galambos, supra note 23, at 73.
32. Total energy production of the G-N Project was estimated to reach a high of 3,775
million kilowatt-hours per year. Galambos, supra note 23, at 74.
33. 1977 Agreement, supra note 14, at 237; Galambos, supra note 23, at 73-74:
The Gabeikovo plant was intended to work only in peak hours: during the rest of the day
most of the water of the river would be retained in the reservoir at Dunakiliti. In peak
consumption hours this water would be allowed to surge through the turbines at
GabWikovo. This would in turn create great changes in the water level-5 m under the
plant-which would be compensated by the Nagymaros dam.
Id.
34. Galambos, supra note 23, at 80.
35. Id. at 80-81; see also THE DANUBE STORY, supra note 23, at 3.
36. Galambos, supra note 23, at 80.81.
37. VODOHOSPODARSKA VYSTAVBA BRATISLAvA,GAB-lKOVo-NAGYMAROS PROJECr: STANDPOINT
1 (Bratislava, April 1992) [hereinafter STANDPOINT OF CZECHO-SLOVAK SIDE]; see also INFORMATION, supra note 17, at 3.
OF THE CZECHO-SLOVAK SIDE AND ANSWERS TO QUESTIONS
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The Hungarian Government subsequently entered into an agreement with the Austrian Government in 1986 to finance the remainder of the Hungarian portion of the Project.3 8 Under the
agreement, the Austrian Government would provide Hungary with
credit to complete the Project. Hungary would in turn provide Austrian contractors with 70% of the construction work. 39 Hungary
would repay Austria by supplying electricity to Austria in 1996 and
4°
for 20 years thereafter.
C.

The Breakdown of Czechoslovakian-HungarianCooperation and the
Abrogation of the 1977 Agreement
At the request of Hungary, Hungary and Czechoslovakia signed a
second Protocol on February 6, 1989, which shortened the construction period of the G-N Project by 15 months. 41 Three months
later, on May 13, 1989, the Hungarian Government unilaterally announced that it would suspend construction work on the
Nagymaros plant for two months to conduct further studies and to
explore Project alternatives. 42
On July 20, 1989, the Hungarian Government extended its construction moratorium until October 3, 1989, and expanded the
moratorium to include its contribution to construction at the
Dunakiliti and Gab~ikovo sites. 43 The Czechoslovakian Government reacted harshly" and warned of the possible implementation
of a unilateral provisional solution. 45 On October 31, 1989, the
38. Galambos, supra note 23, at 81; see also STANDPOINT OF CZECHO-SLOVAK SIDE, supranote
37, at 1.
39. The construction of the Hainburg hydroelectric plant in Austria had recently been
stopped by popular protest. Galambos, supra note 23, at 81. The Austrian firm,
Donaukraftwerke, which had held the contract to construct the Hainburg plant, was awarded
the contract to construct the Nagymaros plant. Id. Work commenced on the Nagymaros
project in 1988. INFORMATION, supra note 17, at 4. For an examination of the political aspects surrounding the decision of Hungary to contract with Austrian contractors, see
Galambos, supra note 23, at 89.
40. The electricity payment to Austria would amount to two-thirds of Hungary's entitlement. Galambos, supra note 23, at 81. The electricity payment would be provided mainly in
the winter months when the Danube River is at its lowest flow rate. Some commentators have
therefore suggested that new power stations would need to be built in Hungary to meet the
energy debt. I&
41. Galambos, supra note 23, at 82.
42. Application of the Republic of Hungary v. The Czech and Slovak Federal Republic on
the Diversion of the Danube River, at 3, I.C.J. (Oct. 22, 1992) [hereinafter Application of
Hungary].
43. Id. at 3; STANDPOINT OF CZECHO-SLOVAK SIDE, supra note 37, at 1.
44. Galambos, supra note 23, at 82-83.
45. Application of Hungary, supra note 42, at 3.
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Hungarian Parliament halted indefinitely construction of the
Nagymaros plant and authorized the Hungarian Council of Ministers to enter negotiations with Czechoslovakia for the modification
46
of the 1977 Agreement.
The Hungarian Government then proposed, in November 1989,
that Czechoslovakia be permitted to continue construction of the
Gabikovo plant as a run-of-the-river operation with appropriate
ecological guarantees. In return, Czechoslovakia would permit
Hungary to abandon construction of the Nagymaros plant.47 Fol-

lowing the "velvet revolution" of Czechoslovakia in the fall of 1989,
the Hungarian Government withdrew its offer 4 8 and proposed that
"the conflict should be solved by the two governments on the basis
of the results of scientific investigations to be made by independent
experts and international institutions." 49 Negotiations resumed
and both parties commissioned domestic expert committees to
study the ecological impact of the Project and its possible
50
alternatives.
The new Hungarian Government published its political program
in May of 1990, stating that it "considers the construction of the
Danube Barrage System a mistake and will initiate, as soon as possible, negotiations on the rehabilitation and the sharing of the damages with the Czecho-Slovak Government to be elected." 51 In April
1991, the Hungarian Parliament authorized the negotiated termination of the 1977 Agreement and the formation of a new agreement providing for "the consequences of the abandonment of the
52
project and the rehabilitation of the Danube area."
46. STANDPOINT OF CZECHO-SLOVAK SIDE, supra note 37, at 2.
47. Id.; Galambos, supra note 23, at 84.
48. STANDPOIr OF CZECHOSLOVAK SIDE, supra note 37, at 2; see also Application of Hungary, supra note 42, at 3.
49. Galambos, supra note 23, at 84. The Hungarian government hoped the new Czechoslovakian Government would be receptive to such a proposal, given the strong opposition to
the C-N Project expressed by the leaders of the "velvet revolution." Application of Hungary,
supra note 42, at 3; Galambos, supra note 23, at 84-85. The Hungarian Government also
hoped that, as democracy came to Czechoslovakia, environmental pressures would be
brought to bear on Prague and Bratislava to force cancellation of the Project.
50. Galambos, supra note 23, at 84-85; STANDPOIr OF CZECHO-SLOVAK SIDE, supra note 37,
at 2. Although the new Czechoslovakian Government virtually excluded participation of
members of the old government, the Slovak Republic Government retained many of the prerevolution political actors and was more resistant to abandoning the G-N Project. Galambos,
supra note 23, at 85.
51. Application of Hungary, supra note 42, at 3.
52. Id. at 4.
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These continued negotiations proved unfruitful. Czechoslovakia
consequently began constructing its provisional solution (the "Provisional Solution") on November 18, 1991, within the territory of
Czechoslovakia. The Czechs intended this solution to allow the operation of the Gab~ikovo plant to continue without Hungary's
53
assistance or cooperation.
The Hungarian Government unilaterally declared, on May 16,
1992, a termination of the 1977 Agreement, effective May 25,
1992. 5 4 The Czechoslovakian Government refused to accept the
Hungarian declaration, arguing that the declaration did not state
sufficient legal grounds for termination. Czechoslovakia, therefore,
considered the 1977 Agreement to continue in force,5 5 supporting
continued plans for a unilateral diversion of the Danube. 5 6 The
Czechoslovakian Government began diversion of the Danube River
7
into the power canal on October 24, 1992.5
As a result of Hungary's denunciation of the 1977 Agreement,
the Austrian firm responsible for constructing the Nagymaros Dam
made a claim against Hungary in May of 1990 for 3.85 billion shillings, plus interest. The firm sought 950 million schillings for completed work. It sought the remaining 2.9 billion shillings for
materials on order, costs of preparatory work, and unrealized profits. Hungary seeks to downsize this claim and reserve a right to pay
58
damages with returned energy.
The European Community Commission met with representatives
of Hungary and Czechoslovakia on October 22, 1992, in an attempt
to reach an interim solution to the dispute. The parties agreed to
53. The Provisional Solution provides for construction of a reservoir and diversion dam
similar to the original plan, but upstream of Dunakiliti at a point (river kilometer 1851.75)
where both banks of the Danube are within the territory of Czechoslovakia. Miroslav Ligka,
GabZikovo-Nagymaros Project Counter-Proposal of Operation Gab~ikovo 3-4 (Oct. 24, 1992)
(on file with the Columbia Journal of Environmental Law) [hereinafter Counter-Proposal];

STANDPOINT OF CZECHO-SLOVAK SIDE, supra note 37, at 17. The Provisional Solution requires
the construction of an 11 kilometer earthen dam from the point of the new diversion dam,
within Czechoslovakia, through the midsection of the Danube River, parallel to the Hungarian border, to the mouth of the power canal. Counter Proposal, supra, at 3-4, and STAND.
POINT OF CZECHO-SLOVAK SIDE, supra note 37, at 17. The effect of the Provisional Solution

will be to divert the flow of the Danube River from its natural course and into the power
canal before it reaches Hungarian territory.
54. Application of Hungary, supra note 42, at 5.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 6.
57. Id. at 3; Peter Maas, Where the Danube Runs Dty; A Slovak Dam Empties a Stretch of River,
WAst. Pos-r, Nov. 30, 1992, at Al, A15.
58. Galambos, supra note 23, at 86.
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establish a working group of experts to examine options for settlement. As a partial result of the European Community (EC) moderation, the parties have entered into a Special Agreement by which
they submit their dispute to the ICJ and establish terms of reference
59
for its adjudication.
On January 1,1992,. Czechoslovakia dissolved into the successor
States of the Czech Republic and the Slovak Republic.
IV.

ENVIRONMENTAL CONSEQUENCES OF THE GABdKOVO-

NAGYMARos PRoJECr

A.

Hungarian Concerns

Advocates of Hungary's position contend that the G-N Project
will harm the environment of the Danube River region. In general,
they assert that it will adversely affect the hydro-dynamic characteristics and pollution levels of the Danube. The particular alleged
consequences are as follows:
The Danube River is capable of supplying approximately 60% of
Hungary's drinking water. 6° Water from the Danube River is of
particularly high quality because of a bank-filtering process in
which water seeps from the Danube through a naturally filtering
bio-active pebble bed 6 ' into an area aquifer hundreds of meters
deep. 6 2 The reservoir will substantially reduce the rate of water
flow, causing sediment to accumulate 63 along both the floor of the
59. The EC sponsored consultations had the additional aim of reaching. a decision on
provisional allocation of water in the Danube River. At the October 28, 1992, London meeting the parties provisionally agreed to permit 95% of the water to flow in the old Danube
River channel, 5% flowing through the power canal. It soon became apparent that this was
impossible due to the construction characteristics of the Provisional Solution. Although negotiations continue, it appears that the parties are, at this time, unable to reach an agreement even as to the matter of a provisional allocation of water. Government to Accept Hague
Court Decision on Dam, 2 April 1993 F.B.I.S. at 9.
60. DANUBE STORY, supra note 23, at 25. The Danube's bank-filtering system provides an
estimated one million cubic meters of water a day for Hungary and two million cubic meters
a day for Slovakia. G-N FiLE, supra note 2, at 10. The aquifer replenished by the Danube
supplies drinking water for approximately 1.5 million people in Hungary. Diverted, Danube
Fades, and the Rage Rises, N.Y. TiMES, Nov. 8, 1992, § 1 at 14.
61. "The relevant part of percolation and natural filtering occurs in the uppermost layer
of the riverbed, some centimetres thick." G-N FILE, supra note 2, at 10.

62.

DANUBE STORY,

supranote 23, at 23; see also THE DANUBE BLUES, supranote 24, at 4; and

Galambos, supra note 23, at 78.
63. An estimated 3-5 million cubic meters of suspended material will settle as sediment in
the Danube River system. G-N FieE, supra note 2, at 12.
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reservoir and river.6 Toxins such as iron, manganese, and other
industrial pollutants that would normally be transported downstream will settle along the floor of the reservoir. 65 The sediment
will also provide a breeding ground for harmful bacteria. 66 Both
the toxins and the bacteria will infiltrate the aquifer and enter
drinking water supplies, 6 7 polluting the ground water reserves
within ten years.r6
As the sediment accumulates, it will have to be dredged. 69
Dredging of the reservoir and riverbed will reintroduce the harmful
pollutants into the surface water, while also destroying the bio-active pebble bed responsible for the natural filtration of the river
water. Destruction of the pebble bed will permit additional organic
micropollutants and microbes to enter and contaminate the aquifer. 70 Leaching of hydrocarbon compounds7 1 from the asphalt
layer lining the power canal will further pollute the river water. 72
The diversion of the river channel will disconnect the main river
from a complex system of tributaries that play an essential role in
73
the self-purification of the Danube River.
The water table upstream of the Dunakiliti Dam 7 4 will rise, causing soil saturation and reducing the productivity of farm land.75
64. DANUBE STORY, siupra note 23, at 23; THE DANUBE BLUES, supra note 24, at 4. The
decrease in the flow speed of the Danube River, coupled with increases in sedimentation,
increases the water's clarity, increasing phytoplankton production. G-N Fn.E, supra note 2, at
12. Increased phytoplankton levels elevate the eutrophication of the water, thereby reducing
its oxygen content. The reduced oxygen content impairs the ability of other oxygen-demanding organisms to survive. DANUBE STORY, supra note 23, at 17.
65. DANUBE STORY, supra note 23, at 23; THE DANUBE BLUES, supra note 24, at 4.
66. WORLD WiLDLn FUND, Repercussions of the Power Station 2 (1991) [hereinafter
Repercussions of the Power Station] (memorandum; copy on file with the ColumbiaJournalof
EnvironmentalLaw).
67. Id&
68. G-N FL, supra note 2, at 11.
69. THE DANUBE BLUES, supra note 24 at 4. The Dunakiliti reservoir may accumulate three
to six million cubic meters of sediment a year. DANUBE STORY, spra note 23, at 26.
70. DANUBE STORY, supra note 23, at 24; see also THE DANUBE BLUES, supra note 24, at 4; G-N
FiE, supra note 2, at 11. The destruction of the pebble bed and seepage of toxins and bacteria into the aquifer could pollute the entire subsurface water resources within 30 to 50 years.
DANUBE STORY, supra note 23, at 23.
71. Carcinogenic benzopyrene is of primary concern. Repercussions of the Power Station,
supra note 66, at 2.
72. Id.
73. THE DANUBE BLUES, supra note 24, at 4.
74. The Dunakiliti reservoir alone will flood sixty square kilometers of farm land. Id.
75. THE DANUBE BLUES, supra note 24, at 4; G-N Fn.E, supra note 24, at 11.
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Below the dam, the water table will lower, 76 reducing crop production 77 and increasing drought susceptibility. 78 The corresponding
fluctuation in the water table will affect the forest habitat of the
region and potentially result in the destruction of 50,000 acres of
floodplain. 79 The lowering of the aquifer will also jeopardize the
80
freshwater supply of local inhabitants.
The complex ecological nature of the river basin in the area of
the G-N Project8 ' means that the basin serves as a fertile ground for
the development of an extremely diverse collection of flora and
fauna.8 2 The complex ecological nature of the area also renders
the flora and fauna highly susceptible to changes in the environment.8 3 Extensive ecological disruption caused by diverting the
river from its natural channel for 25 kilometers will likely destroy an
estimated 80-90% of the 5000 animal species that inhabit the

76. The ground water level above the reservoir will rise due to excessive seepage from the
reservoir, while the ground water in the area of the diversion canal will fall due to the reduction of seepage from the old river channel. DANUBE STORY, supra note 23, at 18.
77. "Where the water table is lowered, mineralization of the vegetation remains is accelerated; the organic material content of the soil is diminished; deterioration of the soil structure
and the eluviation of nutrients grows dangerous." G-N FILE, supra note 2, at 11.
78. DANUBE STORY, supra note 23, at 18; see also THE DANUBE BLUES, supra note 24, at 14;
ISTER, East European Environmental Research, FUTURE OF THE DANUBE 2 (1991) [hereinafter FUTURE OF DANUBE]. "Where the operation of the barrage lowers the ground water level
from the fine surface layer down to the gravel, capillary water supply of the root zone is
stopped. As a result, the crop of cultivated plants is reduced considerably and becomes uncertain; drought resistance is weakened." G-N FiLE, supra note 2, at 11.
79. Repercussions of the Power Station, supra note 66, at 1.
80. Shortly after the October 24, 1992, diversion of the Danube into the power canal,
peasant farmers in the area discovered that, not only had the river disappeared, but also their
"wells had run dry." Where the Danube Runs Diy; A Slovak Dam Empties a Stretch of River, supra
note 57, at Al; see also Diverted, DanubeFades, and the Rage Rises, supra note 15.
81. The Danube flood plain in this area is composed of a multitude of tributaries, small
lakes, and marshes that are dependent for water upon the seasonal fluctuation of the river
levels. Repercussions of the Power Station, supranote 66, at 1; THE DANUBE BLUES, supra note
24, at 4.
82. Repercussions of the Power Station, supra note 66, at 1; THE DANUBE BLUES, supra note
24, at 4. The region of the Danube River basin affected by the G-N Project contains at least
sixty protected species of flowering plants, sixty-three of the eighty species of fish native to
Hungary, and has produced eleven newly discovered species of fungi in the last few years. GN FLE, supra note 2, at 13.
83. Repercussions of the Power Station, supra note 66, at 1; THE DANUBE BLUES, supra note

24, at 4. The ecosystems in the Danube River basin have adapted to the seasonal dynamics of
water fluctuation, gradually following the constantly changing supply of water. G-N FiL,
supra note 2, at 12. Drastic changes to this gradually evolving process would result in "degradation and decay," requiring centuries to regenerate. Id.
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area.8 4 The fish population alone is likely to fall by 25%. Commercial fish yields will likely fall by a staggering 90%.85
Although the G-N Project was intended to increase the flood control level of the region,86 there is concern that the quality of the
reservoir embankments and the walls of the canal do not meet international standards of structural stability.8 7 Concern also exists
that the Project lacks measures to prevent accidental flooding or to
88
protect the surrounding area from floodwaters.
The G-N Project facilities are constructed "in the area of a geologically young fault."8 9 Geological and seismological characteristics of the region were little understood at the time the Project was
conceived. In fact, at the time of conception, no geological or geophysical evaluations of the impact of the G-N Project had been conducted. 90 The complicated nature of the region has, however,
become apparent during the course of preliminary construction. 9 1
Without further studies to determine the necessary modifications to
the G-N Project,92 the parties would be risking "human and economic disaster" with financial losses running "ten times the cost of
the whole investment." 93 The economic costs of maintaining and
operating the G-N Project, 94 coupled with the costs of measures to
84. G-N FnrE, supra note 2, at 13; seeaso THE DANUBE

BLUES,

supra note 24, at 4.

85. DANUBE STORY, supra note 23, at 18.

86. Not only could flood control in the region be achieved by cheaper and safer means,
Galambos, supra note 23, at 79, but the Project destroys the currently existing natural flood
control. Repercussions of the Power Station, supra note 66, at 2.
87. Repercussions of the Power Station, supranote 66, at 2; THE DANUBE BLUES, supra note

24, at 4.
88. DANUBE STORY, supra note 23, at 31; Galambos, supra note 23, at 79.

89.

THE DANUBE BLUES,

supra note 24, at 5.

90. G-N FiLE, supra note 2, at 9; DANUBE STORY, supranote 23, at 28. For example, "the socalled Gab~ikovo fault line discovered in Slovak territory has not been traced further in Hungary. This fault was the reason why the site of the Gabkiovo dam was changed in the early
70s, although by not more than 600 m with respect to the original plan." G-N FiLE, supra
note 2, at 9.

91.

DANUBE STORY,

supra note 23, at 28.

92. The studies would need to include geological, tectonic, engineering-geological, hydrogeological, and regional pollution sensitivity studies. Id.
93. THE DANUBE BLUES, supra note 24, at 5. The embankments of the Dunakiliti reservoir
have been constructed over "high-resistivity gravelly structures - ancient riverbeds," that could
cause a breach in the embankment and an ensuing flood. G-N FiLE, supra note 2, at 10. This
situation is particularly dangerous because the embankments of the Dunakiliti reservoir do
not meet international safety standards. IM.
94. These costs include "[pilant repairs and maintenance, [a]rtificial management of the
water table (pumping installation and maintenance), [r]einforced flood control and protection downstream." Repercussions of the Power Station, supra note 66, at 2.
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moderate environmental damage 9 5 and the value of lost agricultural production will dwarf the value of energy produced over the
life of the Project. 96
Diversion of the Danube into the power canal will physically isolate the villages of Dobrohost, Vojca, and Bodiky from the rest of
Slovakia. 9 7 The physical separation, coupled with the environmental devastation and the reduced agricultural production will cause a
rural exodus from these villages. 98 The diversion into the power
canal will also deprive Hungary of access to the economic resources
of 25 kilometers of the Danube River. This access was one of the
primary rationales for locating the international border along the
median of the Danube River.
B.

Slovak Rebuttal

Slovakia asserts that Hungary has grossly exaggerated the environmental dangers of he G-N Project. It contends that it is not
only possible to mitigate much of the Project's feared environmental damage, but the Project will have significant environmental
benefits.
Slovakia asserts, for example, that the Dunakiliti reservoir will actually improve water quality by slowing erosion 9 9 and slowing the
rate of the Danube, thereby permitting larger quantities of water to
pass through the bio-active pebble layer and dilute the currently
polluted aquifer. 100 According to Slovakia, the Hungarian projections of reduced water quality due to the decrease in oxygen con95. These costs include the value of lost fisheries and forestry, the installation of new irrigation systems for agriculture, and the improvement of water purification systems. Repercussions of the Power Station, supra note 66, at 2; see ahso DANUBE STORY, supra note 23,at 31-35.
96. THE DANUBE BLUES, supra note 24, at 5; see also DANUBE STORY, supra note 23, at 31-35.
If the G-N Project were fully utilized for electrical power generation, it would fulfill only
three percent of Hungary's total electrical power requirements. DANUBE STORY, supra note
23, at 25.
97. Repercussions of the Power Station, supra note 66, at 3. Although these three villages
are located in Slovakia, their populations are approximately 75% ethnic Hungarian. Id
98. Id at 1-3.
99. Signifwiance and Impacts of G-N Project supra note 1, at 7.
100. PART GAndKovo, supra note 15, at 1.
The reservoir would increase the infiltration into the ground-water, primarily into its top
layer... The infiltrated water would flush-away the polluted water into the deeper situated live branches: the Little Danube and the Mosony Danube. The reservoir would
[provide] a permanent flow into the Mosony Danube ... and to flush away its heavy
pollution.
STANDPOINT OF CZECHO-SLOVAK SIDE, supra note 37, at 13.
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tent of the river, 10 1 the increasing siltation of the reservoir, 10 2 and
04
the infiltration of toxins' 0 3 are based on scant scientific research
10 5
and are contrary to reports from international experts.
Slovakia also notes that the current water table in the Danube
Region may fluctuate by as much as seven meters, creating less than
ideal conditions for agricultural production. 10 6 The G-N Project
will reduce the fluctuations in the aquifer level, raise the water table
the water
where crops have been susceptible to drought, and lower
10 7
table where crops have been damaged by inundation.
The harm caused by the change of the hydraulic regime will most
likely alter the wildlife habitat in the meadow-forests and fish
habitat. 0 8 Slovakia argues that the impact on the meadow-forest
can be mitigated by timing discharge of water from the Dunakiliti
reservoir and the construction of "low stony barrages" in the old
river bed. 1°9 In fact, the Project will bring water to regions of the
Danube meadow-forests in Hungary that are currently drought-ridden throughout much of the year." l 0

The G-N Project is also the most economically efficient means of
controlling floods in this region of the Danube."' Further,
Slovakia asserts that a number of comprehensive studies attest to
101. The projected decrease in oxygen content by 40-50% is exaggerated by a factor of
ten. Basic Informations, supra note 17, at 21.
102. The projected increase in the sedimentation of the Dunakiliti reservoir is exaggerated by a factor of five. I. In fact, any sedimentation that may occur will prove a positive
effect on the region since "the silt obtained by dredging can be usefully utilized to improve
the quality and the insufficient depth of the top-layer of arable land on many places of the
Danube plain." Id. at 22.
103. Studies conducted at high water periods have determined that no traces of toxic
materials are present in the neighboring water wells. Id. at 22.
104. I. at 22-23.
105. SLOVAK NATIONAL AGENCY FOR FOREIGN INVESTMENT AND DEVELOPMENT, THE
GABdKovo DAM Q&A FACr SHEET, 2 [Mar. 1993] [hereinafter GABdKOVO DAM PRESS RELEASE]
(available from the Embassy of the Slovak Republic, Wash., D.C.). "International experts
from Bechtel Environmental, Inc., Hydro Quebec International and an ECC Working Group
have confirmed that the Gab~kovo Dam does not threaten the region's environment." Id.
See also Resolution of the National Council, supra note 25, 5, at 16.
106. Basic Informations, supra note 17, at 25.
107. Id. at 25; PART G ABKOvo, supra note 15, at 2.
108. Basic Informations, supra note 17, at 24.
109. Id. at 24. The .canal will produce ideal conditions for the generation of "river-side
forests" along a 32 kilometer stretch of the power canal. PART GABfKOvO, supra note 15, at 3.
110. GABUKOVO DAM PRESS RELEASE, supra note 105, at 2. The Project will also create a
number of new fish ponds that will largely improve the conditions for breeding fish. Id.
111. Basic Informations, supra note 17, at 26 .
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the geological stability of the region and the structural integrity of
112
the Project facilities.
V.

LEGAL ISSUES AFFECTING RESOLUTION OF THE GABCiKOVONAGYMAROS

DISPUTE

The Slovak Republic" l3 contends that Hungary may not legitimately terminate the 1977 Agreement without Slovakia's consent. 114 Slovakia, therefore, considers the 1977 Agreement to
continue in force. Slovakia deems itself entitled to implement any
provisional solution necessary to realize the benefits that would
have accrued to Slovakia if Hungary had not withdrawn from the
Agreement. 115 Slovakia may also contend that Hungary owes
Slovakia damages equal to the difference in the benefit that would
have accrued under the Agreement and the benefits that will accrue after construction of the Provisional Solution.
Slovakia further asserts that the Provisional Solution is intended
as a temporary measure, 116 while affirming its willingness to return
to an operation of the G-N Project as set forth in the Agreement. If
prohibited from operating its Provisional Solution, Slovakia presumably will contend that it is entitled to damages in the full
amount of the benefits it would have received from operation of
117
the G-N Project.
Most of the legal arguments asserted by Hungary address the legality of the Provisional Solution, not the question of damages or
breach of contract.' 1 8 Hungary asserts that the Provisional Solution
and the subsequent diversion of the Danube River violate Hun112. STANDPOINT OF CZECHO-SLOVAK SIDE, supra note 37, at 14.
113. Since the dissolution of Czechoslovakia, the Czech Republic has attempted to disentangle itself from the dispute. The former Czechoslovakian negotiation teams are now composed entirely of representatives of the Slovak Republic.
114. STANDPOINT OF CZECHO-SLOVAK SIDE, supra note 37, at 9; see also Counter Proposal,
supra note 53, at 5; G-N FILE, supra note 2, at 14. Other than the Hungarian submission to
the International Court ofJustice, the parties have not publicly engaged in detailed explanations of their legal positions. Most of the insight into the parties' legal positions comes either
from small inclusions in technical reports or broad statements made in informative type
brochures. Similarly, the report of the EC Commission limited itself to technical options for
resolution of the dispute.
115. Basic Informations, supra note 17, at 37; see also Counter Proposal, supra note 53, at 5.
116. Slovakia asserts that it can bypass the Provisional Solution merely by opening its control gates, when and if Hungary agrees to implement fully the 1977 Agreement. Counter
Proposal, supra note 54, at 5.
117. See Resolution of the National Counci4 supra note 25, 7 at 16.
118. G-N FILE, supra note 2, at 14-16.
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garian sovereignty and territorial integrity. 1 19 Specifically, Hungary
argues that the diversion of the Danube violates the 1947 Paris
Peace Treaty,1 20 the Danube River Convention, 121 and a number of
bilateral treaties between the former Czechoslovakia and Hungary.122 Hungary further contends that the Provisional Solution "violates the rules and principles of customary international law that
regulate the status and utilization of transboundary environmental
23
resources such as international rivers."'
A.

Does the 1977 Agreement between Czechoslovakia and Hungay
providingfor the construction of the Gab~aivo-Nagymaros
Project continue in force?
1. The Legitimacy of the Hungarian Denunciation of the
1977 Agreement

The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 124 will provide
the basis for an analysis of the legality of Hungary's denunciation of
the 1977 Agreement. The Vienna Convention is frequently referred to as the treaty on treaties, purporting "to constitute a comprehensive set of principles and rules governing the most
significant aspects of the law of treaties." 25

119. Application of Hungary, supra note 42, at 8.
120. Id.
121. Id. at 10.
122. Id. at 9.
123. Id. at 10.
124. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, opened for signature May 23, 1969, 1155
U.N.T.S. 331 [hereinafter Vienna Convention] (entered into force Jan. 27, 1980).
125. Sm LAN SINCLAIR, THE VIENNA CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF TREATIES 5 (2d ed. 1984).
The Vienna Convention is generally considered to codify existing customary international
law and is, therefore, dispositive in the resolution of treaty disputes between non-signatories.
Id. at 3. Before a practice amounts to customary international law, it must (1) be practiced by
States in a constant and uniform manner (regular and repeated, not universal practice), and
(2) must be accompanied by the conviction that such conduct is in conformity with a legal
right or duty. I. BROWNL1E, PRINCIPLES OF PUBUC INTERNATIONAL LAw 4-7 (1990). Czechoslovakia ratified the Convention on July 29, 1987. Hungary ratified the Convention on June 19,
1987. However, because the parties entered into the 1977 Agreement prior to their ratification of the Convention, and the exclusively proactive application of the Convention, the
Convention must be applied to this dispute as customary international law. See Vienna Convention, supra note 124, art. 4. Application of the Vienna Convention as customary international law will only affect the procedure set forth for notification of treaty termination and
judicial settlement of disputes. See Vienna Convention, supra note 124, arts. 65-68.
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The Effect of Error on the Validity of a Treaty

The Vienna Convention provides for the abrogation of a treaty
on the grounds the treaty was concluded as the result of a fundamental mistake by one of the parties. McNair summarizes the doctrine of error as follows, "There is general agreement amongst
writers that a treaty concluded as the result of a fundamental mistake induced in one party, .. . by circumstances involving no negligence on its part . . . is void, or at any rate voidable, by that
party."' 26 The error must be of such a nature that, if it had been
known, the party would not have consented to the formation of the
127
treaty.
Although the effect of error on the validity of contracts has been
substantially addressed in municipal law, international tribunals
have rarely had opportunity to confront the issue. 128 The formulation of Article 48 of the Vienna Convention was expressed in relatively restrictive terms, only permitting a State to "invoke an error in
a treaty as invalidating its consent to be bound by the treaty if the
error relates to a fact or situation which was assumed by that State
to exist at the time when the treaty was concluded and formed an
essential basis of its consent to be bound by the treaty." 129
126. LORD McNAR, THE LAW OF TREATIES 211 (1986); see also W. E. HALL, TREATISE ON
INTERNATIONAL LAw 360-68 (1895); SCHWARZENBERGER, A MANUAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

158-59 (1967).
127. LORD McNAM, supra note 126, at 211; T. 0. ELIAS, THE MODERN LAw OF TREATIES 155
(1974). The Vienna Convention provides that a State may terminate a treaty where its agreement has been fraudulently induced. Specifically, Article 49 states, "If a State has been induced to conclude a treaty by the fraudulent conduct of another negotiating State, the State
may invoke the fraud as invalidating its consent to be bound by the treaty." Vienna Convention, supra note 124, at 208.
Hungary has not, as yet, alleged that Czechoslovakia fraudulently induced Hungary to
enter into the 1977 Agreement. Some of Hungary's literature appears to argue, however,
that the Hungarian communist government of 1977 committed fraud on the Hungarian people by disallowing a full exploration of the environmental and scientific issues raised by the
proposed G-N Project. Danube Blues, supra note 24, at 3, 5. Although this type of fraud
would not fall within the scope of Article 49, it does raise the question of whether a treaty
may be invalidated on the grounds that the people of a State were fraudulently induced to
accept the agreement. The international community would probably reject any such arguments of "fraud on the population."
128. In its commentary to the Vienna Convention, the International Law Commission refers to three cases forming the basis for Article 48. Legal Status of Greenland 1933 P.C.IJ.
(ser. A/B) No. 53, at 71 (June 5); Temple of Preah Vihear (Cambodia v. Thail.), 1961 I.C.J.
17; 1962 I.CJ. 6 (May 26); Re-adaptation of the MavrommatisJerusalem Concessions (Greece
v. U.K.), 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 11, at 1 (Oct. 10). All three cases addressed, in dicta, the
matter of error.
129. SINCLAIR, supranote 125, at 172. Article 48 states:
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In order to assert that error renders the 1977 Agreement invalid,
Hungary must, therefore, demonstrate that a mistake occurred with
regard to a fact or situation at the time of entering into the Agreement. Most importantly, it must also show that the mistake, if
known to Hungary, would have dissuaded it from entering the
Agreement. Two possibilities exist for Hungary to assert the theory
of error: (1) mistake as to extent of environmental consequences
and (2) mistake as to the actual cost of construction and operation
of the Project facilities.
Hungary would contend that the 1977 Agreement lacks
validity
because Hungary's consent to the Agreement was based on an erroneous belief that the construction of the G-N Project would have a
minimal impact on the environment of the Danube Region. This
argument would prevail only if Hungary demonstrates that, at the
time of entering the Agreement, Hungary believed that the Project
would not substantially affect the environment or that physical mitigation projects would prevent serious environmental damage.
Hungary would then need to prove that, if it had known of the
environmental threat posed by the Project, it would not have consented to the Agreement. 1 s°
Slovakia would, in turn, contend that Hungary cannot argue that
it mistook the extent of environmental harm because the Project
will not substantially harm the environment. Slovakia has already
asserted that Hungary bases its forecast of environmental harm on
miscalculations, and that physical solutions would substantially miti1. A State ... may invoke an error in a treaty as invalidating its consent to be bound by
the treaty if the error relates to a fact or situation which was assumed by that State ... to
exist at the time when the treaty was concluded and formed an essential basis of the
consent of that State... to be bound by the treaty.
2. Paragraph I shall not apply if the State... in question contributed by its own conduct
to the error, or if the circumstances were such as to put that State ... on notice of a
possible error.
3. An error relating only to the wording of the text of a treaty does not affect its validity;,
Article 80 then applies.
Vienna Convention, supra note 124.
130. The Danube Defense Action Committee asserts Czechoslovakian and Hungarian
political leaders have often stated:
Such a project could and would not be approved today. If the cost of construction and
maintenance, including the costs of those steps required to moderate environmental
damage (steps which would unfortunately prove ineffectual), were added to the likely
loss in agricultural production, and these were compared to the value of the energy
produced, it is obvious that the costs would not be recovered within the projected service
life of the technical installations.
THE DANUBE BLUES, supra note 24, at 5.
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gate any environmental harm.13 1 Slovakia could further assert that
no error occurred because the 1977 Hungarian Government was
aware of any potential environmental harm that might result from
32
the Project.'
In the alternative, Slovakia might argue that, even if the Hungarian Government mistook the environmental effect of the Project, Hungary's own conduct contributed to that error. By
suppressing the dissenting views of hydrologists and ecologists at
the time of negotiating the Agreement, the 1977 Hungarian Government was directly responsible for any miscalculation of the environmental cost of the Project. Slovakia could support this
argument with Hungarian publications that suggest that the 1977
Hungarian Government suppressed views that questioned the sensi33
bility of the G-N Project.'
Slovakia may also assert that, even if Hungary mistook the extent
of environmental harm, Section 2 of Article 48 of the Vienna Convention requires Hungary to prove that this mistake of fact was essential to the Hungarian Government's consent to the 1977
Agreement. Hungary would find it difficult to offer proof of detrimental reliance on this mistake of fact because, " [ t] he communist
ideology and the communist economic system were decisive factors
in dragging the Hungarians into the joint project."13 4 As noted
above, the "transformation of nature" was an integral component of
the communist ideology. The 1977 Hungarian Government, if
aware of the environmental consequences of the Project, believed
either that it could construct its way out of the consequences or that
the consequences were sacrifices necessary for the benefit of indus35
trial expansion.'
Hungary may also contend that, at the time it consented to the
1977 Agreement, it mistook the future level of energy consump131. Basic Informations, supra note 17, at 21-27; STANDPonrr OF CZECHO-SLOVAK SIDE,
supra note 37, at 14-15; INFORMATION, supra note 17, at 5, 10. Slovakia maintains that, "when
all the impacts of alternative solutions are taken into account, the Gab~ikovo-Nagymaros Project has to be considered as a real environmental project securing a mutually harmless coexistence of people and nature on the Danube-plain, with beneficial effects overreaching to a
much larger region." Basic Informations, supra note 17, at 27.
132. NFORMATION, supra note 17, at 3; Galambos, supra note 23, at 75-76.
133. THE DANUBE BLUES, supra note 24, at 3, 5.
134. Galambos, supra note 23, at 75. Hungary's consent to the Agreement was also substantially influenced by the interests of the Soviet Union. Id.
135. See Galambos, supra note 23, at 75-76; THE DANUBE BLUES, supra note 24, at 6.
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tion,13 6 the expense of constructing the Project,1 3 7 and the costs of
its continued operation and maintenance.13 8 Hungary would contend that these financial errors were critical to its consent.1 3 9 Hungary could further argue that it mistook the economic benefits of
the Project, erroneously believing that these benefits would outweigh the costs of environmental degradation and lost agricultural
production.
Slovakia might respond by arguing that the Project's projected
costs were accurate and that current levels of energy consumption
continue to justify the Project.1 40 Alternatively, Slovakia might argue that, although the costs of the Project have increased, the internal rate of return on the investment is the same or greater than that
projected at the time the Project was conceived.1 4 1 If these arguments fail, Slovakia could turn to the argument that, although the
projected costs were underestimated, the industry practice of underestimation was taken into consideration at the time of the
Agreement.1 4 2 Hungary may not, therefore, now claim mistake as to
the actual cost of the Project.
In response to Hungary's argument that it mistook the environmental cost and the energy benefits of the Project, Slovakia may
also assert that the Project's navigational and flood control benefits
would tip the scale back to a point where an argument of mistake
should not succeed. Slovakia might more convincingly argue, however, that the environmental and agricultural costs must be calcu136. INFORMATION, supra note 17, at 32. "In Czecho-Slovakia, the basic energy consump-

tion per resident is around 50% higher than in the industrialized countries of the [W]est. In
fact if calculations are based on gross domestic product, consumption is actually three times
higher." Repercussions of the Power Station, supra note 66, at 3.
137. DANUBE STORY, supra note 23, at 33-34.

138. Id. at 34. One commentator notes:
From an economic point of view the project will incur huge losses, even in the long run.
All its stated benefits could have been realized by safer and cheaper means, without
raising credits, without diverting resources from more important goals and without ruinAccording to a cost-benefit analysis of an
ing other-more valuable-resources ....
expert committee (Hardi et al., 1989), the complete cancellation of the project would be
more favorable in the long run from an economic point of view....
Galambos, supra note 23, at 79-80.
139. According to an Educational Summary commissioned by the Hungarian Government, the primary stimulus for the G-N Project in 1977 was the desire to produce cost-effective energy. INFORMATION, supra note 17, at 31. In fact, all of the Project's other benefits
could be "realized at less expense, with different technical solutions, less burden on the environment, and on a different schedule." I&.
140. PART GAEIKOVO, supra note 15, at 5-6.
141. Id.
142. DANUBE STORY, supra note 23, at 33.
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lated from the perspective of the parties at the time they entered
into the Agreement. The communist governments of Hungary and
Czechoslovakia in 1977 placed a substantially higher value on the
social need for energy production necessary for industrial progress
than the need for environmental or agricultural protection. 143
b. Lawful Termination of a Treaty When Treaty Is Silent on Issue
of Termination
The Vienna Convention indicates that a right to unilateral termi44
nation of a treaty that does not expressly provide for termination
shall be implied where the discernable intent of the parties at the
time of contract was that such a right should exist.1 45 Importantly,
Article 56 is framed in the negative, evidencing the presumption
against a unilateral right to withdraw from a treaty. Under Article
56, the negative presumption against unilateral withdrawal may be
overcome if the withdrawing party can establish that, when entering
the agreement, the parties intended to subject the agreement to
the right of unilateral withdrawal.'4 Such an intent may be established through either an examination of the "general circumstances" surrounding the agreement or the negotiating history of
47
the agreement.
Hungary must produce evidence of general circumstances or negotiating history sufficient to establish an implied right to unilateral
withdrawal from the Treaty. None of the literature published by
143. An interesting question raised by this discussion is: What party should bear the cost of
unpredictable change in societal values? The unpredictability of the way in which societal
values will change suggests that the parties to the agreement would, under a Rawlsian veil of
ignorance, have distributed the risk evenly between the two. On the other hand, the society
whose values have changed may rightly pay the full price for indulging its changed values. See
JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971).
144. The 1977 Agreement does not contain provisions for its termination. 1977 Agreement, supranote 14.
145. Article 56 of the Vienna Convention states:
1. A treaty which contains no provision regarding its termination and which does not
provide for denunciation or withdrawal is not subject to denunciation or withdrawal
unless:
(a) it is established that the parties intended to admit the possibility of denunciation or
withdrawal; or
(b) a right of denunciation or withdrawal may be implied by the nature of the treaty.
2. A party shall give not less than twelve months' notice of its intention to denounce or
withdraw from a treaty under paragraph 1.
Vienna Convention, supra note 124, art. 56.
146. SINCLAIR, supra note 125, at 186.
147. I&
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the Hungarian Government has specifically mentioned or alluded
to any mutual expectation of a unilateral right of withdrawal. Until
Hungary produces such evidence, it will be unable to overcome the
negative presumption against the right to unilateral withdrawal.
A right to unilateral withdrawal under Article 56 also exists where
it can be naturally implied from the treaty itself 1 48 The ICJ has
construed this exception quite narrowly, limiting its application to
149
treaties of alliance and commercial or trading agreements.
Although the 1977 Agreement deals with commerce, the mutual
benefits arising under the Agreement will not accrue until the Project's completion. Implying the right to unilateral withdrawal in
construction contracts would introduce prohibitively high risk in
their execution.
c. Changed Circumstances as Justificationfor Termination of a
Treaty
The customary international law doctrine of "a fundamental
change of circumstances" may prove a more effective justification
for Hungarian withdrawal from the 1977 Agreement. The changed
circumstances doctrine allows a party unilaterally to terminate or
suspend the operation of a treaty on the ground "that there has
been a fundamental change of circumstances from those which existed at the time of the conclusion of the treaty." 150 Although the
ICJ has generally proven reluctant to approve the unilateral termi148. Vienna Convention, supra note 124, art. 56.
149. SmCLAR, supra note 125, at 186.
150. ELiAs, supra note 127, at 119. In one of the earliest appearances of the changed
circumstances doctrine, the Queen of England in the early 1590's invoked the doctrine in
withdrawing England's commitment to provide troops to the Netherlands for its war against
Spain. Queen Elizabeth I had agreed to send English troops. ATHANAssios VAMVouios, TERMINATON OF TRAxTmrs IN INTERNATiONAL LAw 61 (1985). The Netherlands agreed that, after

the war, it would reimburse England for soldier's pay. Id. In the course of the war, England
depleted its treasury. The Queen explained that England's empty war chest constituted a
changed circumstance by which it could legally excuse itself from further performance under
the agreement. Id. at 62. Notably, the Netherlands did not question the validity of the
changed circumstances doctrine itself (though it did dispute its applicability to the instant
circumstances). Id.
The changed circumstances doctrine was similarly invoked by the Russian Empire in the
early 1870's in an attempt to terminate Articles 11, 13, and 14 of the 1856 Treaty of Paris,
which provided for the neutralization of the Black Sea. Id. at 67. Russia asserted that the
articles no longer applied because (1) the European balance of power had fundamentally
changed and (2) "the introduction of iron-clad vessels, unknown and unforeseen at the conclusion of the Treaty of 1856, increased the danger for Russia in the event of war by adding
considerably to the already patent inequality of the respective naval forces." Id. at 68. While
not denying the Russian assertion, the parties to the treaty insisted that the articles of the
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nation of a treaty on the grounds of changed circumstances, the
Court has accepted the doctrine as a principle of international
law. 151
Immediately prior to World War I, many States invoked the
changed circumstances doctrine to "escape inconvenient treaty obligations." 152 Frequently the States invoked the doctrine when the
changed circumstances merely rendered the performance inconvenient.153 Given the potential for abuse of the changed circumstances doctrine, the drafting States of the Vienna Convention
sought to limit its application by requiring the party seeking withdrawal to prove that the alleged changed circumstances: (1) are
fundamental to the operation of the treaty, (2) did not exist at the
time of treaty negotiation, (3) were not foreseeable by the parties,
(4) would have affected the consent of the parties to the treaty, and
treaty may only be terminated with the mutual consent of all parties, not unilaterally. Id. at
71-72.
For additional cases where States have relied upon the doctrine of changed circumstances,
see ELLAS, supra note 127, at 120, and VAwVouKos, supra this note, at 70-117.
151. SINClAIR, supra note 125, at 193. For a detailed examination of the I.C.J. rulings on
change of circumstances see VAMVOUKOS, supra note 150, at 153-174. In the FisheriesJurisdiction Case, the International Court stated:
International Law admits that a fundamental change in the circumstances which determined the parties to accept a treaty, if it has resulted in a radical transformation of the
extent of the obligations imposed by it, may, under certain conditions, afford the party
affected a ground for invoking the termination or suspension of the treaty.
Fisheries Jurisdiction (U.K & N. Ir. v. Ice.), 1973 I.C.J. 3, 18 (Feb. 1973).
In admitting to the existence of the changed circumstances doctrine, the Court sought to
limit its applicability by stating,
In order that a change of circumstances may give rise to a ground for invoking the
termination of a treaty it is also necessary that it should have resulted in a radical transformation of the extent of the obligations still to be performed. The change must have
increased the burden of the obligations to be executed to the extent of rendering the
performance something essentially different from that originally undertaken.
Id. at 21. The Court further limited application of the changed circumstances doctrine by
stating,
The doctrine never operates so as to extinguish a treaty automatically or to allow an
unchallengeable unilateral denunciation by one party, it only operates to confer a right
to call for termination and, if that call is disputed, to submit the dispute to some organ
or body with power to determine whether the conditions for the operation of the doctrine are present.
Id. at 22.
152. SINCLAIR, supra note 125, at 193.
153. Id. at 199-200. For a discussion of the application of the doctrine of changed circumstances during this period, see Garner, The Doctrineof Rebus Sic Stantibus and the Termination of
Treaties, 21 A.J.I.L. 509 (1927).
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(5) radically transform the nature of the obligations to be per154
formed by the parties.
A number of changed circumstances do affect the necessity and
viability of the G-N Project.1 5 5 The substantial improvements in energy conservation technologies developed since 1977 mean that the
Project may not be necessary to meet the energy needs of Slovakia
and Hungary.1 5 6 Similarly, the shift from economic reliance on
heavy industry production to light manufacturing substantially
57
reduces the need for increased energy production.
Eastern European trade shifted away from the former Soviet
Union and toward Western Europe with the fall of communism in
Eastern Europe. This shift lessened both the need for improved
navigability of the Danube River in this region and the need for
"socialist integration." 5 8 Likewise, the dissolution of the Warsaw
Pact and the former Soviet Union have rendered superfluous the
military benefits to be derived from the G-N Project. Additionally,
Hungary and Slovakia, no longer Soviet satellites, are no longer sus154. The changed circumstances doctrine embodied in Article 62 of the Vienna Convention states:
1. A fundamental change of circumstances which has occurred with regard to those
existing at the time of the conclusion of a treaty, and which was not foreseen by the
parties, may not be invoked as a grounds for terminating or withdrawing from the treaty
unless:
(a) the existence of those circumstances constituted an essential basis of the consent of
the parties to be bound by the treaty, and
(b) the effect of the change is radically to transform the extent of obligations still to be
performed under the treaty.
2. A fundamental change of circumstances may not be invoked as a ground for terminating or withdrawing from a treaty:(a) if the treaty establishes a boundary; or
(b) if the fundamental change is the result of a breach by the party invoking it either of
an obligation under the treaty or of any other international obligation owed to another
party to the treaty.
Vienna Convention, supra note 124, art. 62.
155. G-N FiLE, supra note 2, at 14. Note, however, that Hungary's application to the ICJ
does not address the issue of changed circumstances. Application of Hungary, supra note 42.
156. Repercussions of the Power Station, supra note 66, at 3; ISTER, Future of the Danube
8 (1991) [hereinafter Future of the Danube] (project proposal by Institute for East European
Environmental Research; copy on file with the ColumbiaJournal of EnvironmentalLaw).
157. Id.
158. G-N FiLE, supra note 2, at 14. The preamble to the 1977 Agreement states that a
primary motivation of the G-N Project is the desire to "further strengthen the fraternal relations of the two States and significantly contribute to bringing about the socialist integration
of the States members of the Council for Mutual Economic Co-operation...." 1977 Agreement, supra note 14, at 236.
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ceptible to diplomatic and military pressure from the Soviet
Union.1 59
The changed economic circumstances of the early 1980s fundamentally affected the ability of Hungary to construct its share of the
Project. Although Slovakia can counter that the agreement with
Austria to underwrite the construction costs in return for energy
payments overcomes this barrier, at least one commentator has
pointed out that Hungary would have to build additional power
6 °
plants to meet its energy payment obligations to Austria. 0
The increased environmental awareness and activism of the Hungarian population, 16 1 coupled with the fall of the totalitarian communist regime in Hungary, substantially inhibits the ability of
1 62
Hungary to carry out its obligations under the 1977 Agreement.
Although the environmental dangers of the G-N Project were
known to a small group of scientists and hydrologists when the
agreement was negotiated, their views were suppressed by the ruling Communist Party, leaving the populace unappraised of these
effects. 163 Since the fall of communism, the Hungarian population
has grown much more environmentally aware and activist. 16 4 Prior
to the 1990 revolution, the totalitarian regime could either silence
159. See I. GCAouRE, THE POLITICAL CONTROL OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA: A STUDY IN SOCIAL
CONTROL OF A SOVIET SATmLIrE STATE (1953). By 1989, "many Hungarians had.come to
regard (the Gabikovo Project] as a symbol of high-handed Communist rule and Soviet domination." Malcolm V. Browne, Slovaks Finish Much-CritiizedDam on Danube, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 3,

1992, at A8.
160. Galambos, supra note 23, at 81.
161. In the fall of 1990, 70% of the Czechoslovakians and 71% of the Hungarians surveyed
agreed with the statement: "The environment has to be cleaned up even if it means some loss
in manufacturingjobs." However, only 7% of the Czechoslovakians surveyed and 18% of the

Hungarians surveyed agreed with the statement: "Cleaning up the environment has to take
second place to industrial growth and the protection ofjobs." Democratization in Eastern
Europe Survey, conducted by the Erasmus Foundation for Democracy (Fall 1990), (reported
in OFFICE OF RESEARCH, U.S. INFORMATION AGENCY, RESEARCH MEMORANDUM, THE ENVIRONMENsr: A BURNING ISSUE IN CENTRAL AND EAsr EUROPE? 9 (Feb. 26, 1991)).
162. G-N FnLE, supra note 2, at 14.
163. THE DANUBE BLUES, supra note 24, at 3, 5.

164. In a recent declaration, the mayors of approximately 50 towns in the region affected
by the G-N Project called upon the government of Czechoslovakia to immediately stop construction of the Provisional Solution. The mayors called for the "success of the priority of the
protection of ecological environmental values in connection with the realization of river

planning" in the Danube Region. G-N Fnz, supra note 2, at 17; see also Eastern Europeans
Protest Hydroelectri Prject, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 4, 1990, § 1, at 22 (noting that 100,000 people
formed 100-mile human chain to protest the Project); HungariansEase Stand Over Dam N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 29, 1991, at A15 (reporting police intervention to break up citizen demonstration near pumping station); Celestine Bohlen, Gab&UvoJoura4"On the Danube, Unbuilt Dams
But Pent-Up Anger, N.Y. TmEs, Dec. 5, 1990, at A4 (noting that environmental groups in
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or ignore domestic opposition to the Project. 16 5 In 1977, the Hungarian Government could enter into and fufill the obligations of
the Agreement, regardless of its environmental or economic repercussions. In 1993, however, the democratically accountable Hungarian Government may neither silence nor ignore the
16 6
overwhelming domestic opposition to the Project.
d.

The Impossibility of Performance as Justificationfor.
Termination of a Treaty

The customary international law doctrine of."impossibility of performance" is similar to the doctrine of changed circumstances. The
impossibility of performance doctrine allows a party to suspend or
terminate performance under a treaty if an object necessary or in16 7
dispensable to the performance of the treaty is lost or destroyed.
The submergence of an island, the drying of a river, or the destruction of a dam or hydroelectric installation indispensable for the execution of a treaty are illustrations of what might be considered
sufficient grounds for reliance on the impossibility of performance
argument.16 s
Czechoslovakia call for halt to construction of G-N Project on the expectation that it will
contaminate ground water sources).
165. See generally R. F. DEaAEv, Tins is CoMMUNisr HuNGARY (1958); I. GAnouREK, supra
note 159.
166. Although the mere change of government does not amount to a fundamental change
of circumstances that would justify the termination of a treaty, the circumstances here are
such that the entire form of government has been changed from a totalitarian regime based
on the principles of Soviet communism to a democratic regime based on the principles of
liberal democracy.
167. ELIAS, supra note 127, at 128-29; SiNcLAiR, supra note 125, at 190-91. The doctrine of
impossibility of performance is set forth in Article 61 of the Vienna Convention in the following manner.
1. A party may invoke the impossibility of performing a treaty as a ground for terminating or withdrawing from it if the impossibility results from the permanent disappearance
or destruction of an object indispensable for the execution of the treaty. If the impossibility is temporary, it may be invoked only as a ground for suspending the operation of
the treaty.
2. Impossibility of performance may not be invoked by a party as a ground for terminating, withdrawing from or suspending the operation of a treaty if the impossibility is the
result of a breach by that party either of an obligation of the treaty or of any other
international obligation owed to any other party to the treaty.
Vienna Convention, supra note 124, art. 61.
168. Y.B. Int'l L. Comm'n 256, [1966] U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1966/Add.1. In CASE oF
SmosA LoANs, and CAsE OF BRAzILrAN LoANs, the Permanent Court of International Justice
denied Serbian and Brazilian claims that it was impossible to pay contracted debts to France,
since the mode of payment-gold francs-no longer existed. 1929 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) (Fr. v.
Serbia) and (Fr. v. Braz.) No. 20/21 at 40, 120. The Court held that the doctrine of impossi-
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Although the Hungarian Government has not publicly asserted
impossibility as a grounds for non-performance of the 1977 Agreement, Hungary might make three arguments to support future
claims of impossibility. The first of these arguments is one of economic impossibility. Hungary entered into the 1977 Agreement at
a time of relative economic strength. During the course of time in
which the Agreement was to be executed, Hungary suffered an economic recession that has destroyed the national economic base indispensable for the execution of the Agreement. In making such
an argument, Hungary would have to overcome the general presumption against permitting a State to absolve itself of international
debt obligations on the grounds that the State has entered into a
period of economic stagnation. 16 9 In this case, however, Hungary
would not attempt to absolve itself of debt obligations from which it
had already received a benefit, but would contend that it is impossible to continue with the joint execution of a treaty designed to produce a mutual benefit.
Slovakia may readily point to the Austrian-Hungarian funding
agreement as proof that Hungary can secure the funds necessary to
fulfill its obligations under the treaty. Hungary would have to overcome this compelling evidence with an argument that it could not
fulfill its obligations under the agreement with Austria. It might
also assert that attempted performance would further depress its
economy, making it even less capable of meeting its share of the
continuing obligations to operate and maintain the Project
170
facilities.
. Hungary could also assert that performance would destroy the
object of the Agreement. Hungary would argue that the environmental degradation caused by the construction of the Project and
the resulting desolation of the surrounding area would destroy the

bility could not be invoked because the designation of gold francs as the form of payment was
merely intended to indicate the value of the loan to be repaid. I. In making this determination, the Court expressed its reluctance to permit liberal use of the impossibility doctrine to
terminate treaties where the intent of the treaty may be achieved despite the disappearance
of an object ostensibly indispensable for the execution of the treaty.
169. See Russian Indemnity Case (Russia v. Turk.), Hague Ct. Rep. (1927) 1 (Scott) 297,
317-18 (Perm. Ct. Arb. 1927), where the Permanent Court of Arbitration rejected Turkey's
argument that it should be absolved from debts owed to Russian lenders because its financial
circumstances and internal rebellion made it impossible to raise sufficient funds to pay those
debts.
170. Galambos, supra note 23, at 81.
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171
Danube Region sought to be improved by the Agreement.
Slovakia could counter that the design of the G-N Project includes
mechanical safeguards sufficient to mitigate any harm to the Danube Region. 172 Even if the Project harms the environment, the object of the Agreement is to improve navigation and generate
hydroelectric power, not to preserve the ecological integrity of the
Danube Region. Although the Project may entail some environmental costs, these costs would not "destroy" the treaty's "object."
Finally, Hungary might assert that its inability to silence or ignore
domestic opposition to the Project has rendered performance impossible. 173 Courts have generally applied the doctrine of impossibility where the "object" of the contract has been destroyed, not
where the "necessary means" of performance have been lost. Only
under an expanded definition of impossibility could the doctrine
be applied where domestic opposition frustrates performance. 174

e.

The Breach of a Treaty asJusticationfor Termination of that
Treaty

Hungary contends that Slovakia's failure to provide adequate environmental protections, as mandated by the Agreement, amounts
to a material breach of the Agreement by Slovakia, 175 releasing
Hungary from any performance obligations. 176 Although Article 60
of the Vienna Convention states that if one party breaches a bilateral agreement, the other party is entitled to terminate the treaty,
171. The Danube Blues makes a similar argument: "No government can be expected to
perform an obligation which would cause inexpiable [sic] harm to its country." THE DANUBE
BLUES, supra note 24, at 9.
172. PART GAB KOVO, supra note 15, at 1-2; see also Signficance and Impacts of G-N Projec
supranote 1, at 7.

173. See supra note 166, and accompanying text.
174. ELIAS, supra note 127, at 134.

175. G-N Fiu, supra note 2, at 14. The 1977 Agreement provides: (1) "The Contracting
Parties shall ensure, by the means specified in the joint contractual plan, that the quality of
the water in the Danube is not impaired as a result of the construction and operation of the
System of Locks." 1977 Agreement, supra note 14, art. 15 (1), at 244; (2) "The Contracting
Parties shall, through the means specified in the joint contractual plan, ensure compliance
with the obligations for the protection of nature arising in connection with the construction
and operation of the System of Locks." Id, art. 19, at 245; and (3) "The Contracting Parties,
within the framework of national investment, shall take appropriate measures for the protection of fishing interests in conformity with the Danube Fisheries Agreement...." Id., art. 20,
at 245.
176. G-N FieE, supra note 2, at 14.
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the Convention requires the breach to have been "material." 177 A
material breach is defined in Article 60 as "(a) a repudiation of the
treaty not sanctioned by the present Convention; or (b) the violation of a provision essential to the accomplishment of the object or
8
purpose of the treaty."'17
In order to prove material breach, Hungary must demonstrate
that adequate environmental protections are essential to accomplish the objectives of the Agreement: provision of electric power
and improvement of navigation.' 79 Hungary will likely find it difficult to prove materiality because a dispute exists over the ability of
physical structures to mitigate effectively the environmental damage caused by the G-N Project' 80 and.Hungary's willingness to participate in water quality improvement initiatives proposed by
8
Slovakia.1 1
Hungary also contends that the Provisional Solution constitutes a
breach of the 1977 Agreement, providing Hungary with the right to
terminate the Agreement.' 82 This argument will likely fail because
Slovakia only initiated the Provisional Solution after Hungary de177. Article 60 states in part "[a] material breach of a bilateral treaty by one of the parties
entitles the other to invoke the breach as a ground for terminating the treaty or suspending
its operation in whole or in part." Vienna Convention, supra note 124, art. 60.
178. 1I
179. See supra notes 15-24 and accompanying text.
180. STANDPOINT OF CZECHo-SLOVAK SIDE, supra note 37, at 14-15.
181. Slovakia asserts that Hungary remains unwilling to participate in a European Community assistance program designed to mitigate the potential groundwater problems caused by
the G-N Project. VODOHOSPODARSKU VysTAVBU, GABUKOVO 20 (1992) (unpaged brochure
with photos published in Bratislava); Letter from Ivan Gasparovic, Chairman of the National
Council of the Slovak Republic, to Egon Klepsh, Chairman of the European Parliament,
published in F.B.I.S.-E.E.U.-93-050 (Slovakia) at 21 (Mar. 17, 1993) (originally broadcast by
Bratislava NARODNA OBRODA in Slovak, Mar. 13, 1993). Hungary's failure to cooperate
with Slovakia in mitigating the Project's harm will weaken Hungary's claim that Slovakia's
failure to comply with the Agreement's water quality protections constitutes a breach, since
Hungary's failure to cooperate has impeded Slovakia's ability to carry out its obligations
under the Agreement.
182. G-N FitLE, supra note 2, at 15. Hungary contends that the Provisional Solution conflicts with the 1977 Agreement. The unilateral act of Slovakia "significantly prejudices the
territorial rights of Hungary, rights which would have been either unaffected or regulated
with the consent of Hungary" under the 1977 Agreement because
[t]he 1977 Treaty balanced rights and duties of both states, attempting to establish material equality in the construction and operation phase of the project. The parties had to
agree upon every significant step; they had to develop the plan of operation jointly and
implement it using detailed mechanisms for harmonization of interests. The benefits of
the operation would have accrued proportionally to both parties. The Barrage System
was designed to be placed in certain locations different from the site of the Provisional
Solution.
Application of Hungary, supra note 42, at 14-15.
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nounced the 1977 Agreement. 1 3 Moreover, Slovakia has committed to disabling the Provisional Solution and returning to operation
18 4
of the Project as originally designed.
2.

The Effect of the Dissolution of Czechoslovakia on the
Continuation of the 1977 Agreement

The dissolution of the State of Czechoslovakia on January 1,
1993, raises the question of whether the Czech Republic and the
Slovak Republic, as successor States, continue to be bound by the
obligations of the 1977 Agreement. The dissolution also raises the
question of whether Hungary continues to be bound by the
obligations.
The Vienna Convention on State Succession t8 5 takes the position
that, if a State breaks up, all successor States are generally bound by
the treaty rights and obligations of the predecessor State, whether
or not the predecessor State continues.18 6 The U.S. Restatement of
the Law of Foreign Relations takes the position that none of the
successor States are bound by the treaty rights and obligations of
the predecessor State, if as a result of the breakup, the predecessor
State no longer exists (the case of a dissolution). 187 However, if
after the breakup the predecessor State continues to exist (the case
of a continuation), 18 the predecessor State is bound by the treaty
obligations, but the breakaway State is not. 8 9
183. See supra note 53 and accompanying text.
184. STANDPOINT OF CZECHO-SLOVAK SIDE, supra note 37, at 18.

185. The Vienna Convention on State Succession articles addressing the succession of
treaty obligations reflect "customary international law" despite the fact that the Convention
has not yet entered into force. Vienna Convention on Succession of States in Respect of

Treaties at 260, opened for signatureAug. 23, 1978, U.N. Doc. A/9610/Rev.1, U.N. Sales No.
F.79.V.10 [hereinafter Convention on State Succession].
186. Article 33 states in part:
1. When a part or parts of the territory of a State separate to form one or more States,
whether or not the predecessor State continues to exist: (a) any treaty in force at the
date of the succession of States in respect of the entire territory of the predecessor State

continues in force in respect of each successor State so formed....
Id.
187. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS § 210 (1987) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT
OF FOREIGN RELATIONS].

188. The continuation of statehood would entail the assumption by the continuing state of
certain nondivisible rights and obligations of the predecessor State, most notably the right to
continue its membership in international organizations.
189. RESTATEMENT OF FOREcIN RELATIONS, supra note 187, at § 210.
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Until recently, no clear precedent existed, outside of the arena of
decolonization, 190 by which to determine whether the breakup of a
State is a dissolution or a continuation. In the case of the breakup
of British India into the States of India and Pakistan, India was generally considered to be the continuation of British India. 191 In the
case of the breakup of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the
Republic of Russia was generally considered the continuation of the
Soviet Union. Finally, it is generally considered that, in the case of
the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Yugoslavia), no succesdissor State is its continuation. Rather, the former 9 Yugoslavia
2
solved and all successor States are treated equally.'
One consistency among the available precedents is that the continuing State, if one exists, retains a substantial portion of the population, territory, and resources of the predecessor State. 193 In the
190. For an examination of the issue of treaty succession in the context of decolonization,
see LoRD McNMR, supra note 126, at 640-54.
191. LoRD McNMR, supra note 126, at 648-49 (citing United Nations Press Release, P.M.
473 (Aug. 12, 1947)).
192. On the occasion of the admission of Slovenia, Croatia, and Bosnia-Herzegovina to the
United Nations, in May 1992, the United States Permanent Representative to the United
Nations stated: "If Serbia and Montenegro desire to sit in the United Nations, they should be
required to apply for membership and be held to the same standards as all other applicants."
United States Mission to the United Nations Press Release of May 22, 1992, USUN Press
Release 35-(92). On September 9, 1992, the United Nations Security Council passed Resolution 777 which states:
Recalling the state formally known as the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia has
ceased to exist, and realizing that the claim by the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) to continue automatically the membership of the former Socialist
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in the United Nations has not been generally accepted;
considering that the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) cannot
continue automatically the membership of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia
in the United Nations; and therefore recommends to the General Assembly that it decide that the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) should apply for
membership in the United Nations and that it shall not participate in the work of the
General Assembly.
U.N. Doc. S/RES/777 (1992).
193. In connection with the creation of Pakistan, the United Nations determined that India possessed the characteristics necessary to constitute the continuation of British India in
1947. Legal Opinion of the Assistant Secretary-General for Legal Affairs, UN Press Release
PW/473, 8/12/47, reportedin A/CN, 4/149 at 2 (1962). This determination is consistent with
the fact that India retained 80% of the former population of British India, 75% of the territory, and a substantial portion of its resources.
In the more recent case of the breakup of the Soviet Union, the Russian Federation has
been viewed by most countries as the continuation of the former Soviet Union. It has, therefore, been permitted to occupy the seat of the former Soviet Union in the United Nations
General Assembly, the Security Council, and other bodies within the United Nations system.
After the dissolution of the Soviet Union, Russia retained over 55% of the population, 77%
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case of the dissolution of Czechoslovakia, the Czech Republic appears to retain 66% of the former Czechoslovakia's population,
62% of the territory, and 71% of the resources of the former State
of Czechoslovakia. 194 The determination of continuity has also
been affected by the existence of a devolution agreement between
the successor States indicating that a particular successor State
should assume the predecessor State's membership in international
organizations.1 9 5 Although the Czech Republic and the Republic
of Slovakia entered into a devolution agreement concerning the allocation of membership in international organizations, this agreement provided that the right to succeed to the membership of
of the territory, and a significant portion of its resources. UNITED STATES CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, THE WoiuD FACTBooK 1992 at 303 (1992).
Unlike India and Russia, Serbia and Montenegro did not contain a substantial majority of
the population, territory, or resources of the former Yugoslavia. The territory of Serbia and
Montenegro constitutes approximately 39.1% of the territory, 43% of the population, and
36.7% of the gross national product of the former Yugoslavia. 38 KEESrNG'S RECORD OF
WoRiD EvENTs, R130 38 (Ref. Supp. 1992). In a press release by the United States Mission to
the United Nations, the United States declared:
We find ourselves in an unprecedented situation. For the first time, the United Nations
is facing the dissolution of one of its members without agreement by the successor states
on the status of the original UN seat. Moreover, none of the former republics of the
former Yugoslavia is so clearly a predominant portion of the original State so as to be
entitled to be treated as the continuation of that state.
USUN Press Release 83-(92), Sept. 19, 1992 (Statement of Ambassador Alexander F.
Watson).
194. Marc Fisher, LittleJoy as Czechs, Slovaks Spli WAsH. PosT, Jan. 1, 1993, at B50.
195. India and Pakistan entered into a devolution agreement stating that India would
maintain the membership of British India in all international organizations. Indian Independence (International Agreements) Order, quoted in 2 U.N. GAOR 6th Comm., Annex 6c, at
308-10, U.N. Doc. A/C.6/161 (1947). In the Alma Ata accords, Russia obtained formal
agreement of all members of the Commonwealth of Independent States that it should be
permitted to occupy the seat of the former Soviet Union in United Nations bodies. Text of
Accords by FormerSoviet Republics Setting Up a Commonwealth, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 23, 1991, § 1 at
10. The United Nations also permitted Russia to assume the seat of the former Soviet Union
because the larger Soviet Republics, Ukraine and Byelorussia, through historical anomally
had already been members of the United Nations since its inception. The residual Soviet
Union, for United Nations purposes, had therefore always been Russia. Additionally, Russia
continued as one of the five Nuclear Weapon States under the Non Proliferation Treaty.
Russia, thus, logically assumed a permanent Security Council seat, along with the other four
Nuclear Weapon States. Unlike India and Russia, no devolution agreement exists among the
republics of the former Yugoslavia. In fact, both Slovenia and Croatia have asserted that the
former Yugoslavia has dissolved and that no individual State is entitled to assume the continuity of Yugoslavia. See Letter from Dimitrij Rupel, Foreign Minister of the Republic of
Slovenia, to Peter Hohenfeliner, President of the United Nations Security Council and Permanent Representative of Austria to the United Nations (on file with Columbia Journal of
EnvironmentalLaw); Note Verbale from the Republic of Croatia to the United States Mission
to the United Nations (June 30, 1992) (on file with ColumbiaJournal of Environmental Law).
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Czechoslovakia would alternate between the Czech Republic and
the Slovak Republic depending on the nature of the organization. 19 6 Similarly, neither the Slovak nor the Czech Republic continued membership as Czechoslovakia, but rather both States
applied and were admitted as new members.
The Vienna Convention on State Succession also takes the position that, if a treaty relates only to a portion of the territory of a
predecessor State, the successor State having authority over that territory shall be bound by the treaty, while the other successor States
shall not be so bound.1 97 Since all of the G-N Project facilities are
to be constructed within the territory of theRepublic of Slovakia, it
could be argued that the 1977 Agreement only continues to obligate Slovakia. However, it could also be argued that, because the
construction works completed before the dissolution of Czechoslovakia were funded by the Czechoslovakian federal government and
the energy. to be produced from the Project was to benefit both
republics in the federation, the Czech Republic continues to be
bound by the Agreement.
Hungary would not raise the issue of State succession at the outset because it contends that the 1977 Agreement was lawfully abrogated on May 25, 1992. If, however, the I.C.J. finds that Hungary
did not lawfully abrogate the 1977 Agreement, Hungary will likely
argue that the theory of succession in the U.S. Restatement of the
Law of Foreign Relations most closely reflects customary international law. 198 Under this theory, the Czech Republic is the continuing State. This construction would mean that, absent a mutual
agreement to the contrary, the treaty does not continue in force
between Hungary and Slovakia.
196. Agreement on Membership in International Governmental Organizations, signed in
Prague December 12, 1992, by the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic, the Minister of Foreign Relations of the Czech Republic, and the Minister of
Foreign Affairs of the Slovak Republic.
197. Article 33 states in part, "(b) any treaty in force at the date of the succession of States
in respect only of that part of the territory of the predecessor state which has become a
successor state continues in force in respect of that successor state alone." Convention on
State Succession, supra note 185, at 99. Article 34 states in part:
When after separation of any part of the territory of a State, the predecessor State continues to exist, any treaty which at the date of the succession of States was in force in
respect of the predecessor State continues in force in respect of its remaining territory
unless: . . . (b) it is established that the treaty related only to the territory which has
separated from the predecessor State. ...
Id. at 99.
198. See supra note 188 and accompanying text.
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Slovakia will likely assert that the Vienna Convention most closely
reflects customary international law. Under this convention
Slovakia, as a successor State to Czechoslovakia, has a right and accompanying obligation to execute the 1977 Agreement. 19 Under
Article 33, Section 1 (a), Slovakia would be bound if the Agreement
was in force with respect to the entire territory of Czechoslovakia.
Slovakia would alternatively be bound under Section 1 (b) if the
treaty was in force only with respect to the territory of Slovakia.
Slovakia would escape obligation under the Vienna Convention on
State Succession only if the Agreement applied exclusively to the
territory of the Czech Republic. This is clearly not the case.
Slovakia would further assert that, even if the Restatement on
Foreign Relations best stated customary international law, the 1977
Agreement applies to the territory of the Slovak Republic. In this
case, the Restatement itself provides, vaguely, that territorial agreements continue notwithstanding the provisions of Section
210(3).200
Recognizing the contentious nature of the G-N dispute, the
Czech Republic has attempted to disassociate itself from liability
arising from the G-N project. If brought into the case, the Czech
Republic would likely argue that the Agreement only applied to the
territory of the Republic of Slovakia. If an international tribunal
determines that Slovakia should be prevented from operating the
Provisional Solution or must pay compensation to Hungary for the
damage caused by the Provisional Solution, Slovakia might seek 20to1
share the burden of compensation with the Czech Republic.
Slovakia would argue that, under the Vienna Convention on State
Succession, Czechoslovakia followed the dissolution pattern, leaving the Agreement in force with respect to the entire territory.
Under the Restatement, Slovakia would contend that the Czech Re-

199. The United States Government has taken the position that the Vienna Convention on
State Succession most closely reflects customary international law relating to continuation of
successor state treaty obligations. It has applied the Convention's approach to the instances
of the former Soviet Union and former Yugoslavia.
200. Section 210(4) does not clearly indicate whether this principle is meant to apply
solely to treaties delimiting territorial boundaries or whether, like the Vienna Convention, it
applies to treaties that affect specific portions of a State's territory.
201. If Slovakia is entitled to compensation from Hungary for any modifications that it
must make in the Provisional Solution to protect the environment, Slovakia will likely argue
that the Czech Republic is not bound by the 1977 Agreement nor entitled to any share of the
compensation.
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public is the continuation of Czechoslovakia, and therefore bound
202
by its rights and obligations.
If Hungary receives compensation for damages caused by the
construction of the Provisional Solution, Hungary will, in an effort
to increase the number of parties from which it can collect compensation, most likely argue that the Czech Republic is also bound by
the 1977 Agreement. Hungary would support this assertion with
the same arguments made by Slovakia : either (1) that the Agreement remains in force with respect to the entire territory of the
former Czechoslovakia, or (2) that the Czech Republic, as its continuation, is liable for damages arising from Czechoslovakia's treaty
obligations.
B.

May Slovakia unilaterallypursue a provisionalsolution consisting
of the construction of the Gabit'kovo portion of the Project on its
territory in light of the Hungarianrenunciation of the
1977 Agreement ?
1. Breach of 1977 Agreement as Rationale for Provisional
Solution

Slovakia contends that Hungary's denunciation of the 1977
Agreement unlawfully breaches 20 3 but does not terminate the
Agreement. 20 4 If the agreement continues in force, Slovakia claims
it may enact provisional measures to "enable the operation of [the
Gab~ikovo] part of the investment, respecting the right on the generated electricity in relation to the invested means, keeping the actual state of borders and creating conditions of operation not worse
(but in many cases better) as were agreed on in the still valid
Treaty." 20 5 Essentially, Slovakia contends that, as a result of Hun202. Slovakia would have to take care in making such an argument because it contradicts
the argument Slovakia would make under the Restatement that the treaty runs with the territory of Slovakia.
203. LORD McNA1R, supra note 126, at 514.
204. STANDPOINr OF CZECHO-SLOVAK SIDE, supra note 37, at 17; see also Counter Proposal,
supra note 53, at 5 (noting that measures were temporary and Slovakia was willing to return
to original agreement).
205. Basic Informations, supra note 17, at 37.
These protective measures are to be considered as of temporary character - CSFR is any
time ready to return to the original condition of the still valid Treaty, if guarrantees [sic]
would be given, about the non-reversibility of this decision and about the repayment of
damages caused by the unilateral action of Hungary, violating the Treaty.
Miroslav B. Liika, The Gabtikovo-Nagymaros Project - latest developments in 1991, at 5
(Vodohospodarska Vystavba, Bratislava Nov. 1991) (eight page memorandum, on file with
the ColumbiaJournal of Environmental Law).
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gary's breach, Slovakia may enact provisional measures that will enable Slovakia to achieve the benefits that, but for Hungary's breach,
206
it would have obtained under the G-N Project.
Although international law recognizes that the injured party may
seek redress for the breach of a treaty, it generally limits redress to a
reciprocal right of termination 20 7 or a right to reparations, 20 8 either
through arbitration 2°9 or non-forcible measures. 210 It is unlikely,
therefore, that Slovakia could successfully contend that an unlawful
denunciation of the 1977 Agreement by Hungary permits Slovakia
to continue construction of the Provisional Solution in an attempt
to achieve the purposes of the Agreement.
International law does, however, provide that rights acquired
under a treaty prior to its termination may not be prejudiced. Only
continuing obligations may be terminated. 21 1 Slovakia must then
consider whether it has obtained any executed rights prior to the
termination of the 1977 Agreement.
If Slovakia fails to assert successfully that Hungary unlawfully repudiated the Agreement, then the Agreement will be considered
terminated as of March 24, 1992. Slovakia would then have to assert that by constructing 90% of the Gabtikovo works prior to termination of the Agreement by Hungary, it acquired a right to divert
the Danube River into the power canal. Slovakia could, therefore,
realize many of the benefits of the Agreement, if it acquired the

206. STANDPOINT OF CZECHO-SLOVAK SIDE, supra note 37, at 17, see also Counter Proposal,
supra note 53, at 5 (noting that measures were temporary and that Slovakia was willing to
return to the original Agreement).
207. LoRD McNAMi, supra note 126, at 553-71.
208. See infra notes 260-64 and accompanying text.
209. LORD McNAIR, supra note 126, at 573-76.

210. I& at 576-78.
211. Id. at 531-33. Quoting Article 33(d) of the Harvard Research Draft Convention, McNair states, "[t]he termination of a treaty puts an end to all executory obligations stipulated in
the treaty; it does not affect the validity of rights acquired in consequence of the performance of obligations stipulated in the treaty." McNair suggests that the Article could continue
with the words, "or the validity of rights acquired in the exercise of powers conferred by the
treaty." Id. at 532. Article 70 of the Vienna Convention states in part:
Unless the treaty otherwise provides or the parties otherwise agree, the termination of a
treaty under its provisions or in accordance with the present Convention:
(a) releases the parties from any obligation further to perform the treaty,
(b) does not affect any right, obligation or legal situation of the parties created through
the execution of the treaty prior to its termination.
Vienna Convention, supra note 124, art. 70.
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right to divert the Danube. 212 If Slovakia successfully asserts that
Hungary's denunciation- was unlawful and that Hungary has
breached the Agreement, then Slovakia may choose to exercise its
right to terminate the agreement.2 13 Since the Provisional Solution
is already in effect and the Danube River has been diverted,
Slovakia might have a strong argument that it has acquired a right
to divert the Danube that may not be canceled by termination of
the Agreement, because it has already implemented the Provisional
2 14
Solution and diverted the Danube.
2.

The Continuing Validity of Pre-1977 Multilateral and
Bilateral Treaties
a.

The Trianon and ParisPeace Treaties

Hungary contends that in implementing the Provisional Solution, Slovakia violates the territorial integrity and sovereignty of
Hungary. Hungary argues that the Provisional Solution violates its
territorial integrity by modifying the Slovak-Hungarian border.
The Provisional Solution modifies the border by diverting the Danube River five kilometers into Slovak territory for a run of 25 kilometers.2 1 5 Hungary also asserts that the diversion violates Article 2,
Paragraph 3, of the Czechoslovakia-Hungary 1956 Bilateral Treaty
on Borders. This treaty states, in relevant part, that "only natural
changes in the watercourse of the river would have an altering ef21 6
fect on the borderline."
Because the 1977 Agreement provides that, notwithstanding the
diversion of the Danube River, the international border will be determined by the center of navigation at the time that the Agreement was signed, Hungarywill unlikely succeed in its argument that
the Provisional Solution infringes its territorial integrity. 217 Hun212. Examples of acquired rights include a payment made under a treaty, the settlement
of a dispute effected by a treaty, the demarcation of frontiers, and the cession of territory.
LoRD McNAn, supra note 126, at 532-33.
213. The exercise of the "right of unilateral abrogation accruing to one party from the
breach of a treaty by the other party ... must be exercised within a reasonable time after the
breach." Id. at 570-71.
214. Hungary will naturally contend that the diversion of the Danube River is an executory
right that does not survive the termination the Agreement.
215. Application of Hungary, supra note 42, at 8-9; G-N FiLE, supra note 2, at 15.
216. Application of Hungary, supra note 42, at 9.
217. Article 22 1(a) of the 1977 Agreement states:
Subsequent to the construction of the System of Locks, the moveable character of the
State frontier in the old bed of the Danube between the [river kilometer] 1840 and r.km.

1994]

DANUBE

DAM DisPuTE

gary could succeed, therefore, only if it proves that the 1977 Agreement is no longer valid. 2 18 If Hungary has successfully terminated
the Agreement, then Slovakia arguably violates Hungary's territorial integrity by relocating the navigable channel of the Danube
and, thereby, modifying the Slovak-Hungarian border. An international tribunal would face the novel question of whether the unauthorized movement of a border violates a State's territorial integrity
even if the movement expands the State's territory.
Hungary also asserts that both States exercise sovereignty over
the river because the section of the Danube forms the international
boundary. Slovakia's unilateral diversion of the Danube, therefore,
amounts to a violation of Hungary's sovereignty.2 19 Hungary bases
its argument on the premise that the exercise of sovereignty over
the Danube provides Hungary with economic benefits derived from
22 0
control over a portion of this natural resource.
The diversion of the Danube will only amount to a violation of
Hungary's sovereignty if the diversion occurs without Hungary's
consent. Hungary may consent to the diversion of the river and,
thereby, waive its right to particular economic benefits from control
of the river resources because Hungary exercises sovereignty over a
portion of the Danube River. Slovakia will likely contend that Hungary consented to the diversion of the river by entering into the
1977 Agreement. It will also argue that Hungary bartered away the
economic benefit of the traditional use of the river for the electrical
1811 segments shall remain unchanged, and the position of that frontier shall be defined by the centre-line of the present main navigation channel of the river....
1977 Agreement, supranote 14, art. 22 1(a), at 245. Article 22 1(c) states, "In the DunakilitiHrugov head-water area, the State frontier shall run from [river kilometer] 1842 along the
centre-line of the present main navigation channel up to boundary point 161V.OA." 1977
Agreement, supra note 14, art. 22 1(c), at 245. See also STADPorTr OF CzECHo-SLOvAK SiE,
supra note 37, at 21.
218. Hungary may assert that the Agreement cannot properly modify a material provision
of the Peace Treaties because the parties to the multilateral Trianon and Paris Peace Treaties
did not participate in the 1977 Agreement and did not consent to the modification of the
Danube River channel. This argument will not likely succeed because, although the 1977
Agreement provides for a modification of the course of the Danube, it provides specifically
that the boundary shall remain in its present state. The 1977 Agreement does not constitute
an unauthorized modification of the Peace Treaties because the material provision of the
Peace Treaties is the boundary, defined by the River, and not the location of the River itself.
219. Application of Hungary, supra note 42, at 8; G-N FieE, supra note 2, at 15.
220. These economic benefits would include fishing resources, water resources for both
potable and agricultural uses, recreation resources, and the opportunity to levy navigation or
transit fees.
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and navigational benefits of the G-N Project. 221 Once again, the

arguments return
22 2
Agreement.
b.

to

the

continuing validity of the

1977

The Danube River Convention and the 1976 BilateralBorder
Waters Agreement

Hungary contends that the unilateral action of the Provisional
Solution violates both the Danube River Convention 2 23 and the
1976 Border Waters Agreement. 22 4 Slovakia responds that the 1977
Agreement embodies Hungary's consent to modify the management of the Danube River as required by the 1976 Border Waters
Agreement. Slovakia adds that the 1977 Agreement was developed
with the consultation and approval of the Danube River Commission as required by the Danube Convention.2 25 The resolution of
221. In fact, the 1977 Agreement attempts to preserve the economic rights of Hungary to
the diverted section of the Danube, despite its location in Czechoslovakia, by providing:
The Contracting Parties shall ...
continue without change to exercise the rights and
comply with the obligations to which they were entitled, or by which they were bound, in
this sector of the river before the conclusion of this Treaty, notwithstanding that the
international shipping lane has in this sector been shifted to the tail-water canal or headwater canal, respectively, situated in Czechoslovak territory.
1977 Agreement, supra note 14, art. 22, 3 at 246.
222. Hungary also asserts that, because the Provisional Solution violates norms of international law regarding territorial integrity and sovereignty, Hungary is entitled to "take lawful
counter-measures (repressalia)" that include the termination of the 1977 Agreement. C-N
FILE, supranote 2, at 15. This argument is unnecessary because, if Hungary successfully terminated the Agreement on May 25, 1992, it cannot be terminated a second time. If Hungary
did not successfully terminate the Agreement, then Hungary is bound by its previous consent
to the diversionary works and cannot now claim a violation of territorial integrity and
sovereignty.
223. Application of Hungary, supra note 42, at 9-10, and G-N FILE, supra note 2, at 16. The
1948 Danube River Convention requires States to "undertake to maintain their sections of
the Danube in a navigable condition ... and to carry out the works necessary for the maintenance and improvement of navigation conditions," in consultation with the Danube Commission. Convention Regarding the Regime of Navigation on the Danube, Aug. 18, 1948, art. 3,
33 U.N.T.S. 197, 199. The Convention also permits States to "undertake works for the maintenance of navigation, the execution of which is necessitated by urgent and unforeseen cir-

cumstances" without prior consultation. Id.
224. The 1976 Czechoslovakia-Hungary bilateral agreement regarding the Management of
Water-Supplies of Border Waters regulates the administration of the Czechoslovakian-Hungarian boundary waters. Specifically, Article 3, paragraph 1 of the Border Waters Agreement
provides that, without mutual consent, the two States will not "take any action in the management of water-supplies that would unfavourably interfere with the mutually determined conditions of the waters" and that they "make use of riverbeds... in such a manner that they do
not cause damages to each other." Application of Hungary, supra note 42, at 9.
225. STANDPOIWT Or CZECHO-SLovAK SIDE, supra note 37, at 18. The 1977 Agreement explicitly states that the parties shall insure uninterrupted and safe navigation of the Danube
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this issue hinges on the validity of the 1977 Agreement. Without
continuing validity of the 1977 Agreement, Slovakia's implementation of the Provisional Solution would violate its bilateral responsibilities to Hungary and its multilateral responsibilities to the other
Danubian States.
3.

Customary International Law Governing International
Rivers
a. NaturalFlow and Equitable Utilization Doctrines

Early Roman law provided that an individual may not legally
change the bed or banks of public rivers in a manner that would
modify the existing natural flow of the waters. 226 Over time, this
principle has come to be stated as: "[t]here may be no diversion
from a watercourse which is of a nature likely to cause substantial
injury to other owners or territorial units whose boundaries are bor227
dered or traversed by the same watercourse."
The prohibition against causing substantial injury to a downstream riparian is an icon of the allocative principle of equitable
utilization. The principle of equitable utilization seeks to employ
River during construction and operation of the G-N Project consistent with their obligations
under the Danube River Convention. 1977 Agreement, supra note 14, art. 18 (1), at 244.

226.

BtLA

Vrrk-N,

THE INTERNATIONAL REGIME OF RrVER NAVIGATION 338

(1979).

227. Id. at 339. The Italian Court of Cassation in 1939 expressed this principle in more
detail:
International law recognizes the right of every riparian State to enjoy, as a participant of
a kind of partnership created by the river, all the advantages deriving from it for the
purpose of securing the welfare and the economic and civil progress of the nation....
However, although a State, in the exercise of its fights of sovereignty, may subject public
rivers to whatever regime it deems best, it cannot disregard the international duty, derived from that principle, not to impede or destroy, as a result of that regime, the opportunity of the other States to avail themselves of the flow of water for their own national
needs.
Id. at 340-41 (citing 9 Annual Digest of PublicInternationalLaw Cases (1938-1940), Case No. 47,
at 120). See also Diversion of Water from the Meuse (Neth. v. Belg.), 1937 P.C.IJ. (ser. A/B)
No. 70, at 26 (June 28); Lake Lanoux Arbitration (Fr. v. Spain), 53 Am. J. INT'L. L. 158, 15870 (1959).
More recently, this principle has been expressed in Article 2 of the United Nations Convention on the Protection and Use of Transboundary Watercourses and International Lakes,
Mar. 17, 1992, 31 I.L.M. 1312 (1992) [hereinafter Convention on Transboundary Water-

courses] and in Article 8 of the Report of the International Law Commission, Draft Articles
on the Law of the Non-Navigational Uses of International Watercourses, 45 U.N. GAOR, 45th
Sess., Supp. No. 10, at 140, U.N. Doc. A/45/10 (1990) [hereinafter Non-Navigational Uses].
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the principles of equity and proportionality of interest 228 to determine whether the diversion or use of a watercourse should be permitted. 22 9 This principle aims to maximize the reasonable and
equitable use of water by riparian States, circumscribed by a prohi23 0
bition against causing substantial injury to an individual riparian.
The 1977 Agreement appears to follow this principle of equitable
utilization by providing for a division of both the construction
costs 23 1 and the electricity benefits 23 2 associated with the G-N Project. Similarly, it contains provisions to mitigate environmental degradation that reflect concern for the rights of downstream riparian
2 33
users.
Hungary contends that implementation of the Provisional Solution would violate the equitable utilization principle because it
would deprive Hungary "of its due share of water quantity, water
quality and power potential and would substantially impair the
quality and quantity of other natural resources." 23 4 The Provisional
Solution likely violates the principle of equitable utilization if the
1977 Agreement has been terminated, because the Provisional Solution diverts the Danube River for the sole benefit of Slovakia and
to the potential detriment of Hungary. If, however, the Agreement
remains in force, then Hungary has consented to the Project and
228. The proportionality of interests test weighs "the value of conflicting interests of opposing States according to the effect (benefit or detriment) upon each of the contested uses
of waters." VrrAir, supra note 226, at 343.
229. Id.
230. See Article 6 of the Draft Articles on the Law of Non-Navigational Uses of International Watercourses which states:
Watercourse States shall in their respective territories utilize an international watercourse system in an equitable and reasonable manner. In particular, an international
watercourse system shall be used and developed by watercourse States with a view to
attaining optimum utilizaticn thereof and benefits therefrom consistent with adequate
protection of the international watercourse system.
Non-Navigational Uses, supranote 227, at 139. See also Convention on Transboundary Watercourses, supra note 227, art. 2, 1 2(c),;at 1315.
231. 1977 Agreement, supra note 14, art. 5, at 239-40.
232. Id. art. 9, at 241-42.
233. Id. arts. 18-20, at 244-45.
234. Application of Hungary, supra note 42, at 10. Hungary also contends that the equitable utilization doctrine requires a state to provide timely notice of, and cooperate With other
riparian States in, the development of a Project that will impact the watercourse. Id. at 11-13.
Although the doctrine of equitable utilization does require States to cooperate in the development of Projects that affect transboundary watercourses, the G-N Project dispute appears
to exemplify extensive cooperation, or at least notification. See supranotes 53 and 59 and
accompanying text. The original Project was the subject of a bilateral treaty, and the Provisional Solution has been the subject of ongoing consultation between Slovakia and Hungary
under the auspices of the EC.
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would likely be entitled to a share of the electric power produced
by Slovakia. If the Agreement is not in force, Slovakia would likely
not have a right to proceed with the Provisional Solution.
Hungary might more persuasively argue that it will suffer substantial injury from the G-N Project that was either unknowable or unforeseeable at the time of contract. Completion of the Project
would, therefore, violate the principle of equitable utilization.
Although this argument is similar to that of error or change of circumstances, Hungary need not have clean hands to succeed. An
equitable utilization argument would permit Hungary to assert that
the Agreement is inequitable, regardless of whether the circumstances were known at the time of contract, because the harm occa23 5
sioned by the C-N Project far outweighs its total benefit.
The factors relevant to the determinations of equitable and reasonable utilization include natural character of the watercourse, social and economic needs of the riparian States, effects of the use on
other riparian States, existing and potential use of the watercourse,
the cost of conservation and protection measures, and the availability of comparably valued alternatives to a particular planned or existing use.23 6 Hungary would, therefore, need to prove that the
environmental consequences cannot be mitigated; that they surpass
the economic benefits to be derived from the Project; and that
there are alternative, environmentally compatible means of achieving the objectives of the G-N Project.
4.

The Requirements of International Environmental Law

Since the conclusion of the 1977 Agreement, concern for preservation of the earth's environment has blossomed. As a result of the
greater concern for environmental protection, many States have
signed and/or ratified a number of multilateral international conventions emphasizing the need for protection of the environment.
The United Nations Conference on the Human Environment provided the forum for the first major multilateral declaration (Stockholm Declaration) on the relationship between humans and their
235. If a tribunal disallows the G-N Project, finding it incompatible with the principle of
equitable utilization, and finds that Hungary bears blame for suppressing or ignoring available information on the environmental effects of the G-N Project, the tribunal will likely
require Hungary to pay Slovakia its share of the construction cost of the Project.
236. Non-Navigational Uses, supra note 227, art. 7, at 139-40.
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environment and the need to promote sustainable development.2 37
The principles of the Stockholm Declaration most relevant to the
dispute between Slovakia and Hungary provide that nature conser238
vation must be guaranteed a priority in economic planning;
States should integrate economic development with protection of
the environment to provide the maximum benefit to their population; 23 9 and States have a sovereign right to use their own natural
resources but must ensure that such use does not adversely affect
240
the environment of neighboring States.
The World Charter for Nature adopted by the United Nations
General Assembly on October 28, 1982, also reflects the international community's growing concern over the destruction of the environment in the course of economic development. 2 41 The World
Charter for Nature departs from the ecological/economic balance
sought by the Stockholm Declaration, preferring specific principles
of environmental protection designed to guide economic development. The principles of the World Charter most relevant to the GN dispute provide that the essential functioning of ecosystems shall
not be impaired,2 42 the genetic diversity must be protected,2 43 and
237. Declaration of the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment, adopted
June 16, 1972, 11 I.L.M. 1416 (1972) [hereinafter Stockholm Declaration].
238. Principle 4 of the Stockholm Declaration states, "Man has a special responsibility to
safeguard and wisely manage the heritage of wildlife and its habitat which are now gravely
imperilled by a combination of adverse factors. Nature conservation including wildlife must
therefore receive importance in planning for economic development." Stockholm Declaration, supra note 237, at 1418.
239. Principle 13 of the Stockholm Declaration states:
In order to achieve a more rational management of resources and thus to improve the
environment, States should adopt an integrated and co-ordinated approach to their development planning so as to ensure that development is compatible with the need to
protect and improve the human environment for the benefit of their population.
Stockholm Declaration, supra note 237, at 1419.
240. Principle 21 of the Stockholm Declaration states:
States have, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations and the principle of
international law, the sovereign right to exploit their own resources pursuant to their
own environmental policies, and the responsibility to ensure that activities within their
jurisdiction or control do not cause damage to the environment of other States or of
areas beyond the limits of national jurisdiction.
Stockholm Declaration, supra note 237, at 1420.
241. World Charter for Nature, GA. Res. 7, U.N. GAOR 37th Sess., Supp. No. 51, at 17,
U.N. Doc. A/37/51 (1982) [hereinafter World Charter for Nature].
242. Principle 1 of the World Charter for Nature states, "Nature shall be respected and its
essential processes shall not be impaired." World Charter for Nature, supra note 241, at 17.
243. Principle 2 of the World Charter for Nature states, "The genetic viability on the earth
shall not be compromised; the population levels of all life forms, wild and domesticated,
must be at least sufficient for their survival, and to this end necessary habitats shall be safe-
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that the conservation of nature is an integral part of economic
244
development.
The Rio Declaration on Environment and Development adopted
by the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development on June 14, 1992, returns to the sustainable development, bal2 45
ancing approach first articulated in the Stockholm Declaration.
The Rio Declaration provides that States have a sovereign right to
use their own resources but must ensure that such exploitation
246
does not adversely affect the environment of neighboring States;
environmental protection shall be treated as an integral part of economic development; 24 7 and States shall apply the precautionary
principle in balancing economic development and environmental
248
protection.
Relying upon the Stockholm Declaration, the World Charter,
and the Rio Declaration, Hungary asserts that States are required
under the norms of international environmental law to maintain
ecosystems necessary for food production, health, and other aspects
of human survival. 249 Hungary also asserts that "the devastating efguarded." World Charter for Nature, supra note 241, at 17. Principle 3 states, "All areas of
the earth, both land and sea, shall be subject to these principles of conservation; special
protection shall be given to unique areas, to representative samples of all the different types
of ecosystems and to the habitats of rare or endangered species." Id.
244. Principle 7 of the World Charter for Nature states, "In the planning and implementation of social and economic development activities, due account shall be taken of the fact
that the conservation of nature is an integral part of those activities." World Charter for
Nature, supra note 241, at 18.
245. Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, adoptedJune 14, 1992, 31 I.L.M.
874 [hereinafter Rio Declaration].
246. Principle 2 of the Rio Declaration states:
States have, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations and the principles of
international law, the sovereign right to exploit their own resources pursuant to their
own environmental and developmental policies, and the responsibility to ensure that
activities within their jurisdiction or control do not cause damage to the environment of
other States or of areas beyond the limits of national jurisdiction.
Rio Declaration, supra note 245, at 876.
247. Principle 4 of the Rio Declaration states, "In order to achieve sustainable development, environmental protection shall constitute an integral part of the development process
and cannot be considered in isolation from it." Rio Declaration, supra note 245, at 877.
248. Principle 15 of the Rio Declaration states, "In order to protect the environment, the
precautionary approach shall be widely applied by States according to their capabilities.
Where there are threats of serious or irreversible damage, lack of full scientific certainty shall
not be used as a reason for postponing cost-effective measures to prevent environmental
degradation." Rio Declaration, supra note 245, at 879.
249. Application of Hungary, supra note 42, at 10-11 (citing World Charter for Nature, and
the Experts Group on Environmental Law of the World Commission on Environment and
Development, Environmental Protection and Sustainable Development (1987) [hereinafter
World Commission]).
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fects of the 'provisional solution' which would break the life supporting systems of the region violate Hungary's right to have
unimpaired jurisdiction over those essential ecosystems." 250 Hungary further asserts that States are under a duty to conserve the
"natural habitat of fauna and flora, in particular those which are
rare, endemic or endangered." 251 The Provisional Solution will, according to Hungary, "cause the disappearance of species diversity
and genetic varieties, and that eventually eighty or ninety percent
of the flora and fauna will vanish," in contravention of the Charter
2 52
directive.
. Hungary further asserts States are required to take "precautionary measures to anticipate, prevent or minimize damage to transboundary resources and mitigate adverse effects," 255 and that "lack
of full scientific certainty shall not be used as a reason for postponing such measures." 254 Arguing from this premise, Hungary asserts
that Slovakia must take measures to prevent environmental harm to
Hungarian territory and may not justify limited protective action
with arguments of scientific uncertainty.
Although Hungary correctly understands that the international
norms of environmental protection have attained unprecedented
world acceptance, it remains unclear whether these norms have attained the status of customary international law or are merely hortatory. Until norms reach the status of customary international law,
an international tribunal is likely to consider them when balancing
the equities of a situation but will not be likely to rest its legal conclusions upon those norms. The norms of environmental protection articulated in the Stockholm and Rio Declarations reflect an
understanding that States should promote economic development
compatible with environmental protection. These declarations do
not flatly prohibit economic development where it will result in
harm to the environment. Although Hungary would assert that the
environmental devastation resulting from the G-N Project would
greatly outweigh any economic benefits of the Project, Slovakia may
still argue that the Project is a model of sustainable development
because it entails only minimal, unavoidable environmental harm
250. Application of Hungary, supra note 42, at 11.
251. Id. (citing the World Charter for Nature and the World Commission).
252. Id. (citing the World Charter for Nature and the World Commission).
253. Id. at 13.
254. Id.
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while providing substantial economic benefit. 25 5 In fact, Slovakia
need only point to the water quality, natural habitat, and fishing
protections of the 1977 Agreement as evidence of its good faith ef256
fort to achieve sustainable development.
Hungary may, however, argue that the recent evolution of international environmental norms constitutes a changed circumstance
for which Hungary should be relieved of its obligation to perform
under the 1977 Agreement. Hungary may argue that since the ratification of the Agreement, the international community's understanding of the environmental consequences of development and
the need to harmonize development with environmental preservation have effected a fundamental change of circumstances suffi57
cient to warrant a unilateral termination of the Agreement.2
C.

What damages, ifany, is Slovakia entitled to as a result of
Hungary's repudiation of the 1977 Agreement? What
damages, ifany, is Hungary entitled to as a result of
Slovakia 's construction of the ProvisionalSolution?

Currently, both Slovakia and Hungary contend that they are entitled to equitable relief for the actions of the other. Slovakia seeks
full capacity operation of the Gab~ikovo Dam, 25 8 while Hungary
255. Slovakia also contends that demolition of the G-N Project, and construction of alternative methods of energy production, flood control, and navigational enhancement would
cause substantial ecological deterioration of the Danube region. STANDPOINT OF CZEoCoSLOVAK SIDE, supra note 37, at 12-13.
256. 1977 Agreement, supra note 14, arts. 15, 19, 20 at 244-45. Slovakia has begun to argue
that, given that it has already constructed portions of the G-N Project, the only rational
means of preventing "environmental damage to the region" is through the Provisional Solution. Resolution of the National Council, supra note 25, 3, at 16.
257. Hungary may also employ these environmental norms to reinforce the principle of
equitable utilization and to define the types of "substantial injury" Hungary will suffer under
Slovakia's alleged violation of the principle of equitable utilization. Hungary may point to
the environmental norms providing for the conservation of ecological habitat, the protection
of biodiversity, and the protection of essential ecosystems as values that must be considered
in the utilization of a transboundary resource, substantial harm to which would constitute
inequitable injury to another riparian State.
258. STANDPOINT OF CZECHO-SLOVAK SIDE, supra note 37, at 17; see also Counter Proposal,
supra note 53, at 5.
The Hungarian decision not to construct the Nagymaros waterworks will essentially disturb the whole concept of the GabEikovo-Nagymaros Waterworks System. Peak power
cannot be generated and the Hruov-Dunakiliti Dam is redundant. The turbines cannot
be used efficiently, and the electric power generation is hampered. In spite of the fact,
the Czechoslovak party is determined to complete and operate at least the Gab ikovo
waterworks and to minimize the negative effects of the waterworks on the environment
and the national economy under the new circumstances.
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seeks to terminate the operation of the dam and to return the Danube to its original state.2 59 If an international tribunal finds
Slovakia equitably entitled to full capacity operation of the
Gabtikovo Dam, Hungary will likely seek compensation for damages arising from this operation. Similarly, if the tribunal determines that Slovakia may not operate the dam, Slovakia will likely
seek compensation for Hungary's breach of the 1977 Agreement.
Each of these scenarios will be considered. 2 60 In "Case A" Slovakia
is allowed to operate Gabtikovo under the Provisional Solution on
the grounds Slovakia is entitled to the benefits intended under the
1977 Agreement. In "Case B" changed circumstances allow Hungary to repudiate the 1977 Agreement and enjoin Slovakia from
continuing operation of the Provisional Solution.
1. Case A: Claims for Damages Arising Under Operation of
the Provisional Solution
If Slovakia is entitled to operate the Provisional Solution, Hungary will seek damages arising from the alleged breach of the 1977
Agreement's water quality, habitat, and fishing resources protections. 2 61 The Agreement does not specify whether breach entitles
the promisee to monetary damages or specific performance.
Traditionally, international law has recognized the award of damages for riparian interference that adversely affects the domestic
water supply, 2 62 hydroelectric generation, 263 flood control, 264 fishing resources, 265 and navigation. 2 66 International law has not, however, generally recognized a right of compensation for the loss of
biodiversity or general environmental degradation. Thus, Hungary
supra note 17, at 10.
259. Hungary asserts that a State is "under an obligation to cease the internationally
wrongful act, re-establish the situation which would have existed if the act had not taken
place and provide compensation for the harm which resulted from the wrongful act" where
the State is responsible for the breach of an international law governing the use of natural
resources. Application of Hungary, supra note 42, at 13-14.
260. The availability of compensation will naturally depend upon the theory used by the
tribunal to render its final determination.
INFORMATION,

261. 1977 Agreement, supra note 14, arts. 15, 19-20, at 244-45.
262. Wilhelm Bush, Compensation and the Utilization of IntenationalRivers and Lakes: The Role
of Compensationin the Event of PermanentInjury to ExistingUses of Water, in THE LEGAL REGIME OF
INTERNATIONAL RIvERs AND LAKEs 315-16 (K. Zacklin & L. Caflisch ed. 1981).
263. Id. at 317-18.
264. Id. at 318-19.
265. Id. at 319-20.
266. Id. at 320-21.

1994]

DANUBE DAM

DisPuTE

may be able to obtain compensation for damage to water quality
and fishing resources if it can demonstrate the Agreement provides
for the possibility of monetary damages and Hungary can quantify
those damages. Hungary will, however, be unlikely to obtain compensation for loss of biodiversity and other general environmental
267
degradation.
Slovakia may contend that no damages are due Hungary because
the G-N Project has resulted in more environmental benefit than
harm. Slovakia may also argue that, having met the terms of environmental protection detailed in the 1977 Agreement, Hungary
may not now effect a modification to the contract by demanding
2 68
additional environmental protections.
Slovakia might settle for a tribunal decision permitting Slovakia's
Provisional Solution. If the tribunal decides that Slovakia must pay
damages or provide other equitable relief to Hungary for the continued Provisional Solution, Slovakia might seek to offset those
damages by claiming compensation from Hungary for damages
caused by the delay in the Project's construction. Slovakia currently
asserts that delayed completion of Gabikovo has cost 500 million
dollars, with a continuing cost of 200 million for each year of delay. 269 In addition to the costs of delay, Slovakia could seek the
267. Hungary may counterclaim that it is entitled to a share of the energy produced by the
Gabikovo plant. The Agreement provides that the G-N Project shall be "jointly owned by
the Contracting Parties in equal measure." 1977 Agreement, supra note 14, art. 8, at 241.
Hungary may claim that it owns one half of the GabEikovo plant and is, therefore, entitled
either to an energy payment or equivalent compensation. Slovakia would argue, however,
that Hungary forfeited its right to payment when it failed to construct the Nagymaros plant
from which Slovakia was to receive a share of the generated electricity. The Gabeikovo plant
cannot be operated at peak capacity because Hungary has not constructed the Nagymaros
Dam. Slovakia may also argue, therefore, that any Hungarian entitlement to payment should
be reduced by the value of the reduced capacity of the Gabikovo plant. Hungary may attempt to counter this argument by asserting that the Provisional Solution deprives Hungary
of valuable use of the Danube, for which Hungary should receive equitable compensation.
268. The 1977 Agreement provides that the Contracting Parties shall protect the water
quality of the Danube as directed by the joint contractual plan. Similarly, the Agreement
requires that they "ensure compliance with the obligations for the protection of nature"
through the "means specified in the joint contractual plan." The Contracting Parties shall,
"within the framework of national investment,"... "take appropriate measures for the protection of fishing interests in conformity with the Danube Fisheries Agreement, concluded at
Bucharest on 29 January 1958." 1977 Agreement, supra note 14, arts. 15, 19-20, at 244-45.
269. GABUiKovo DAM PRESS RELEASE, supra note 105, at 3. See also INFORMATrION, supra note
17, at 9. The calculation of damages includes losses from unproductive commitment of investment resources (including interest payments and cost of inactive capital), lost energy
production, cost of maintenance, and cost of interim flood protection measures. Information, supra note 17, at 7. This calculation of damages does not include "[tihe losses of navigational companies sailing on the Danube which arise in this section due to unfavorable draft
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costs associated with the Provisional Solution, including the construction cost of the Hungarian portion of the Gabikovo Dam and
270
the Dunakiliti reservoir.
Although Article 26 of the 1977 Agreement does not address
damages for breach or termination of the Agreement, it does provide damages for delay or incompleted work. Article 26 specifically
states that the contracting parties are liable to one another both for
damages caused by delay or incomplete work and for those -damages arising from the deterioration of physical structures held in
common property. 27 1 If a tribunal finds the Agreement enforceable, it will also likely hold Hungary liable, under Article 26, for the
damages associated with delayed construction caused by its unlawful denunciation of the Agreement.
In Case A, it would appear that Hungary would do best to abide
by the 1977 Agreement as it relates to the Gab~ikovo Project. Hungary would then compensate Slovakia for an equitable portion of
the cost of the Project and receive an equitable. share of the energy
benefits. 272 Hungary and Slovakia could then negotiate a settlement, offsetting the environmental damages sought by Hungary
with the economic damages sought by Slovakia. If Hungary wished,
it could sell its energy entitlement and use this income to fund environmental protection measures.
2.

Case B: Claims for Damages Resulting From Enjoining the
Operation of the Provisional Solution

If a tribunal determines that Slovakia is not entitled to its Provisional Solution, Slovakia will likely seek restitution or reliance damages. 2 73 Slovakia might also seek expectancy damages associated
conditions and the necessity to stop navigation in the periods of low water flow, which are
assessed to millions of dollars." INFORMA-TION, supra note 17, at 10. Prolonged delay in operation could result in substantial deterioration of the physical works, including the lining of the
canal. INFoRmArroN, supra note 17, at 13.
270. These costs would be offset by the financial gain of retaining what would have been
Hungary's share of the energy production of Gab~ikovo.
271. 1977 Agreement, supra note 14, art. 26, 2(c), at 247.
272. According to Slovakia, under joint financing and operation of the Gab~ikovo Dam,
"[t]he natural allocation of primary hydroenergetic potential in this section is about 62:38
percent in favour of CzechoSlovakia" PART GABUKOVO, supra note 15, at 6. Presumably,
Hungary would be liable for 38% of the construction costs in return for its 38% of the energy
benefit.
273. Slovakia claims to have invested 15 billion crowns on construction of the G-N Project
prior to Hungary's termination of the Agreement. Information, supra note 17, at 7. Slovakia
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with lost power generation and other benefits of the Project. 274 In
this scenario, Slovakia will not likely be entitled to compensation
for the 90% of the Project that it completed before Hungary repudiated the Agreement. Although the Agreement provides for damages resulting from delay or insufficient works, 2 75 it does not
provide for damages resulting from valid termination of the Agreement. It is far from certain that a tribunal would imply such an
unconventional liquidated damages clause either in law or equity.2 7 6 The same analysis would apply to Slovakia's claim for lost
expectancy. 277 Slovakia might prevail on the equity argument that,
even if changed circumstances allowed lawful termination of the
Agreement, Slovakia is not responsible for the changed circumstances. The costs associated with termination should, therefore,
278
be borne equally by both parties.
Alternatively, Slovakia may argue that Hungary is liable for construction costs incurred between 1981 - when Hungary initiated
negotiations with Czechoslovakia - and the present. Such an argument would rest on the assertion that Hungary proposed in bad
faith that Czechoslovakia assume responsibility for construction of
the G-N Project. Slovakia would need to show that Hungary never
2 79
intended to complete its share of the construction.
Although an international tribunal might enjoin operation of the
Provisional Solution, Hungary could still seek a claim for damages
occurring during Slovakia's temporary operation of the Provisional
claims to have invested as much as 18-25 billion crowns in the Project.
note 15, at 5.

PART

GAdKovo, supra

274. The total economic damages suffered by the parties in the event the G-N Project is
abandoned and alternative solutions implemented for energy production, flood control, and
improved navigation are estimated to reach ten billion dollars. Significance and Impacts G-N
Project, supra note 1, at 4.
275. 1977 Agreement, supra note 14, art, 26, at 247.
276. LoR McNAIR, supra note 126, at 576-78. Note also that Hungary has asserted that
any compensation due Slovakia for suspended operation of the Provisional Solution would
have to be offset by the savings of having eschewed the financial burden of operation, maintenance, and environmental mitigation measures. DANUBE STORY, supra note 23, at 37.
277. Additionally, Hungary claims that, "[t]he customary legal practice of the (now
ex-)socialist countries does not recognise the concept of unrealized profits, and thus the
CzechoSlovakian claims relating to this would be unfounded." DANUBE STORY, supra note 23,
at 38.
278. Under this argument, Slovakia would be solely liable for the costs accrued after Hungary announced its termination of the Agreement.
279. As Slovakia has yet to make this argument, it is unclear whether the facts so far
claimed by Slovakia would support this contention.
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Solution since October of 1992.280 Hungary's claims for interim
damage would be subject to the same parameters as those concerning damages arising from the Provisional Solution generally.
VI.

CONCLUSION

The above examination of the legal issues involved in the G-N
Project dispute answers the three questions posed in the
introduction:
(1) What legal questions are central to the resolution of the dispute?
The legal question central to a judicial resolution of the dispute
is whether Hungary was legally justified in its unilateral abrogation
of the 1977 Agreement. If the 1977 Agreement was unjustifiably
terminated (or remains in force), Hungary will owe Slovakia substantial damages. If such is the case, Slovakia might be permitted to
continue the operation of the Provisional Solution, possibly allowing Hungary to emend with performance under the 1977 Agreement. 28 1 If the 1977 Agreement was lawfully terminated or is
subject to valid termination, then Slovakia will be prohibited from
undertaking its Provisional Solution. The complicated question for
a tribunal would then be whether Slovakia bore the risk of Hungary's valid termination, or whether the cost of reliance should be
equitably split between the two parties. The legal resolution of the
dispute rests on the validity of Hungary's renunciation of the Agreement as determined by the well established treaty law doctrine of
changed circumstances, and not with the politically expedient assertions of territorial sovereignty or the evolution of international
environmental law.
(2) Does either party have a solid legal basis for its position in the
dispute?
Hungary had no irrefutable legal right to unilaterally denounce
the 1977 Agreement. Hungary might, therefore, be liable for damages resulting from that denunciation and damages arising from its
continued interference with adequate completion of the Gab~ikovo
Dam. Similarly, Slovakia has no irrefutable legal right to attempt to
achieve the benefits that it would have accrued under the 1977
Agreement by implementing its Provisional Solution. Continued
280. See Dispute Over Danube Dam Threatens Hungarian Wetlands, N.Y. TimEs, July 11, 1993,

§ 1 at 10 (interim operation of the Provisional Solution is threatening the survival of a 200square-mile wetland and flood plain).
281. The question that arises is: what amount of compensation does Slovakia owe Hungary
under the provisions of the 1977 Agreement?
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operation of the Provisional Solution may, therefore, give rise to a
valid claim for environmental damages suffered by Hungary.
(3) What use may be made of the substantial environmental evidence
collected by the parties?
The environmental evidence collected by the parties proved necessary to apply the principles of international environmental law to
the dispute. 28 2 If the parties continue to pursue their dispute at the
International Court of Justice, the environmental evidence will play
a key role in determining whether Hungary properly abrogated the
1977 Agreement under the doctrine of changed circumstances.
The most useful application of the environmental evidence collected by the parties, however, will be to determine the financial
parameters of any settlement negotiations.
Given the above conclusions, a resolution of the G-N Project dispute between Slovakia and Hungary will most likely result from a
shift away from allegations of environmental harm and violations of
international environmental law and towards settlement negotiations. Settlement negotiations should address the following narrow
questions: (1) How much is Slovakia willing to compensate Hungary for continued operation of the Provisional Solution? and (2)
Would that amount offset the environmental harm sustained by
Hungary? Likewise, the negotiations might resolve (1) how much
Hungary is willing to compensate Slovakia for foregoing operation
of the Provisional Solution, and (2) whether this compensation will
allow Slovakia to obtain alternative energy supplies equivalent to
the amount that would have been produced by the Gab~ikovo
plant. In narrowing the issues to these factual, nonlegal questions,
the parties are more likely to reach a quick and equitable resolution
of their dispute.

282. The environmental evidence collected by Hungary provides the basis from which it
asserts protection of its rights under international environmental law. The environmental
evidence collected by Slovakia serves the reciprocal purpose of defending Slovakia from Hungary's assertions of a violation of international environmental law.

